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I. INTRODUCTION 
All warfare is based on deception.  Therefore, when capable, feign 
incapacity; when active, inactivity.  When near, make it appear that you 
are far away; when far away, that you are near.  Offer the enemy a bait to 
lure him; feign disorder and strike him.  When he concentrates, prepare 
against him; where he is strong, avoid him.  Anger his general and confuse 
him.  Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance.  Keep him under 
strain and wear him down.  When he is united, divide him.  Attack where 
he is unprepared; sally out when he does not expect you.  These are the 
strategist's keys to victory. 1
       - Sun Tzu, The Art of War 
 
A. BACKGROUND 
Deception has long been recognized as a vital part of military operations.  From 
hiding a small team of soldiers inside a wooden horse to penetrate the thick city walls of 
Troy to the elaborate scheme to protect the Allied invasion of Normandy, exploiting the 
“fog of war” has proven integral to defeating an opponent.  There is a general feeling that 
deception is a lost art in an age of globalized networks and rapid information flow; and 
that it is virtually impossible. Although deception seems to be a lost art, it is important to 
understand that in the Information Age, where the continuous reduction in the cost of 
technology levels the playing field among state and non-state players, there remains a 
necessity to shroud your movements and intentions or deliberately confuse your 
adversary.  Successful deception can have far-reaching results, not all of which lie strictly 
within the military realm.   
While some classical strategic thinkers, such as Clausewitz, discounted the utility 
of deception, others, like Sun Tzu and Machiavelli, treated deception as the cornerstone 
of any military campaign.2  The ultimate goal of any military action is furthering friendly 
aims while denying those of your adversaries.  Clausewitz believed that all military 
action was subject to “fog,” or hindrances beyond an army’s control.  Department of 
Defense Joint Publication 3-58 defines deception as “those actions executed to 
deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military 
 
     1 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford University Press:  1963), 66-70. 
      2  Michael Mihalka, German Strategic Deception in the 1930s (Santa Monica: RAND, July 1980), v.   
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capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific 
actions that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission.”3  More 
succinctly, deception allows friendly forces to shape Clausewitzian “fog” by fostering 
misinformation in your adversary.  This further facilitates creating favorable conditions in 
the battle space.  Deception can take place at all three levels of military operations4, and 
contains six basic principles:  focus, objective, centralized control, security, timeliness, 
and integration.5  Successful deception campaigns throughout military history have often 
integrated these principles.   
The focus of a military deception event is the adversarial decision maker capable 
of taking the desired action.  Normally, the intelligence system of an adversary is not the 
direct target; rather, it is the primary conduit by which information reaches the decision 
maker.  Since the ultimate goal is to persuade an adversary to pursue a particular course 
of action, utilizing target sets other than decision makers minimizes the likelihood of 
successfully deceiving an adversary.   
This stated ultimate goal of a deception operation is the objective.  It is critical for 
the enemy to not only perceive an artificial aspect of reality, but they must act (or fail to 
act) based on that perception.   
Centralized control is key to a deception operation.  All elements involved in the 
operation must be intimately coordinated to avoid confusion, and ensure that the 
deception doesn’t break down under scrutiny. 
Closely related to centralized control is the aspect of security.  Security is the act 
of protecting knowledge of your operations from internal and external entities that would 
pass that knowledge (inadvertently or not) to the adversary. 
Timeliness ensures that the chain of events surrounding the target allows friendly 
forces to adequately exploit success of the deception campaign.  Conducting the 
campaign in a timely manner ensures that the information is relevant, and that the 
adversary’s intelligence organizations receive the information in time to affect the 
decision maker.   
 
     3 JP 3-58 (31 May 1996), v. 
4 Strategic, operational, and tactical. 
     5 Principles and definitions; Ibid., I-3. 
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Deception campaigns must be fully integrated into other portions of the operation.  
Integration should occur as an inherent part of the overall campaign planning process. 
When considering these six principles, it is also important to note that the most 
important tenet of a deception campaign is that the success or failure of the overall 
military objective cannot depend on the success or failure of the deception effort.  While 
the deception campaign can greatly enhance the advantage enjoyed over an adversary, it 
should not be a gambit such that its failure will lead to total campaign failure. 
It is also important to note that deception campaigns can often have unintended 
consequences, where even successful deception leads to disaster.  Take for example the 
CIA use of Soviet double agents to report inflated gains on US biological weapons 
programs back to the Soviet Union.  In reality, the US biological program in question had 
been deemed impossible to culminate and had been shut down, but the CIA wanted to 
force the Soviets to spend more capital in development.  Thus, they fostered the idea that 
the program had actually reached its goal.  The deception had the intended effect, in that 
the Soviets spent progressively more money on their program.  However, the Soviets 
succeeded where the US scientists could not, developing a credible biological capability.6  
The legacy of this deception effort is still felt, as the collapse of the Soviet Union 
scattered the scientists who developed this capability into an increasingly unsteady world 
climate.  It is critical to understand the potential for these consequences.  Although they 
cannot be entirely planned for or mitigated, it serves as a footnote to potential consumers 
of deception operations that they could indeed occur. 
This thesis will center on deception operations as they affect policies at the 
national strategic level.  Although the center of gravity at this level is senior-echelon 
decision-makers in the civilian or military sections of government, strategic deception 
campaigns can include elements of strategic, operational, and tactical maneuver.  The 
overall objective is shaping an adversary’s foreign or domestic policy in a manner to 
facilitate reaching a strategic goal.  Often times, the military becomes the vehicle by 
which these operations are conducted, as the threat of military action is much more 
immediate than that of other instruments of national power, such as economic sanctions.  
At the very least, strategic deception causes uncertainty in an opponent by making him 
 
   6 Raymond Garthoff, "Polyakov’s Run,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Sep/Oct 2000), 37-40. 
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choose between believing the information presented, and trusting in the findings of their 
intelligence organizations.  While both conditions would be ideal, with an adversary 
acting upon faulty information, as well as potentially questioning true intelligence, either 
condition could qualify as successful deception if it contributes to meeting the overall 
strategic objectives.  
The Information Age has brought new capabilities and new challenges to the 
arena of deception.  In an age of information dominance, deception has become anathema 
to the free exchange of ideas, and running such operations has the potential to become a 
political landmine.  With the global nature of mass media, the hint of a deception 
campaign could potentially be broadcast within the borders of a target nation, casting 
immediate doubt on any ongoing operations.  Furthermore, as a deception effort 
translates to many as an effort by a government to manipulate information, it is possible 
that conducting such a campaign can shed a bad light on that nation, to the point of giving 
an unexpected advantage to their adversary.   
More than ever, this rapid exchange of ideas highlights an ethical dimension of 
deception.  As conflicts move from the conventional end of the spectrum to more 
asymmetric engagements, the idea of wartime ethics versus peacetime ethics becomes 
murky.  By combining Sun Tzu’s maxim at the beginning of this chapter with the 
Clausewitzian belief that war is merely politics through other means, the corollary to 
remember is that deception in keeping with the strategic goals of a nation is sometimes 
necessary. 
The Information Age paradigm of deception and the potentially problematic way 
in which the deception element plays into other operations does not diminish the value of 
deception to military operations.  The tools that enable the rapid, free exchange of ideas 
are the very tools that can be used to perform deception.  As with any age of 
technological advancement, doctrine must be developed to meet rising technology.  The 
true test of a deception campaign, as we will examine with the case studies in this thesis, 
is whether or not it aids a nation in reaching its strategic goals. 
The face of warfare has consistently changed over the last two centuries.  Recent 
changes place a heavy reliance on the ability of a military or state to be able to control all 
aspects of the information battlespace.  It is therefore critical to underline the continuing 
5 
importance of deception on warfare in the Information Age by analyzing past deception 
campaigns to determine what lessons might be learned.  The rearmament of Interwar 
Germany and Saddam’s Iraq provide two examples of modern strategic deception 
campaigns, conducted during periods of interim peace between two periods of conflict.   
Interwar Germany (1919-1939) conducted a campaign of rearmament in violation 
of the Versailles Treaty.  This campaign encompassed political, military, and industrial 
deception, allowing Germany to convince the rest of the world that they had created an 
unstoppable army throughout the 1930s.  Ultimately, however, they did not possess the 
resource capacity to produce the outcome they envisioned.  The deception campaign 
ended in 1939 with the onset of hostilities; however, as the case study will show, failure 
to terminate that campaign largely contributed to ultimate strategic failure. 
The deception campaign surrounding Iraqi weapons programs (1980-2003) 
involved subverting the control measures implemented by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty and avoidance of United Nations mandates following Desert Storm.  The latter 
part of the campaign proved less successful than the first, culminating in a full 
declaration of their weapons capabilities in 1996.  However, at best, the failure of the 
regime to terminate their deception efforts led the United Nations to be wary of Iraq’s 
compliance.  At worst, willingly continuing the deception campaign proved detrimental 
to the Iraqi regime.  Either scenario resulted in continued sanctions, inspection efforts, 
and regime overthrow in 2003. 
By applying the Department of Defense framework to both campaigns, it is 
possible to validate that framework.  Although the German and Iraqi campaigns each 
contained similar successful tenets and enjoyed periods of success, the end results were 
drastically different than their strategic aims.  By conducting an analysis of these two 
case studies, it is possible to analyze the dangers of conducting a successful deception 
campaign can have.  It is also possible to hypothesize that deception efforts must have a 
clear, planned termination point.  Allowing deception campaigns to continue without 
termination can cause grave damage to strategic goals.  The lessons learned from these 
campaigns can be used to ensure that friendly forces, cognizant of the effects they 







The purpose of this thesis is to explore the importance of a solid framework for 
deception by examining two examples of deception campaigns ran at a national level, and 
determining if they successfully met the overall national strategic goals of each nation.  
The case studies under review in this thesis were selected because they are examples of 
successful deception that led to ultimate strategic disaster.  With the Department of 
Defense striving for a massive overhaul of how we conduct business, understanding the 
importance of deception is vital to the conduct of future operations.  Only by meeting 
challenges before they arise can we hope to successfully overcome the daunting task of 
conducting warfare against asymmetric threats, for which the art of deception is a 
valuable force multiplier.  It is equally as important to realize that the masks of success 
and failure in a deception campaign are often hard to tell from one another, until they are 
compared to the success of strategic goals.  This document will provide a framework to 
aid in this undertaking.  The majority of documentation in this thesis will be gleaned from 
primary and secondary sources on the two case studies.  The intent of this work is to 
serve as a comparative study and analysis covering the fundamental topics organic to 
conducting deception. 
 
C. HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
A deception effort in a strategic campaign must follow a viable framework and 
reach a clear termination point consistent with overall policy objectives 
Every military operation has a point at which it is no longer viable, or a 
terminating point.  The planning and execution of any military operation must take this 
terminating point into account, as rapidly developing events can quickly render the 
campaign useless or compromised.  Additionally, military operations must take into 
account the ability to stop an operation.  Conventionally, the goal of successful military 
operations is often easily realized as:    
Winning = Campaign Over 
7 
Ending a strategic deception campaign, however, offers a unique challenge, especially 
when the deception does not culminate in direct military action.  However, engaging in 
direct military action does not mitigate the need to properly terminate a deception 
campaign. 
 To explore this hypothesis, the following questions must be answered: 
1.  What background factors in each case study contributed to a ripe environment for 
deception?  Were these factors common between Germany and Iraq? 
2.  Did either nation have a history of deceptive national policy?  Could this history have 
contributed to cognitive perceptions by adversaries aiding or detracting from the success 
of the deception campaign? 
3.  Did each case study follow a particular framework?  Was the framework common 
across both case studies?   
4.  Were the six principles of deception properly utilized?  Did their use or lack of use 
have an impact on the deception outcome? 
5.  Did the entire strategic campaign depend on the success or failure of the deception 
efforts?  If so, did the overall national strategy for Germany and Iraq meet its objectives?  
If the strategy did not meet its objectives, was this failure due to the deception campaign? 
6.  Were Germany and Iraq able to successfully terminate the deception campaign once it 
had run its course? 
7.  What lessons must Information Operations planners take into account for a successful 
deception campaign? 
Answering these questions will provide a basis for planners to account for the successful 
termination of a deception campaign before it is launched. 
 
D. SCOPE 
This thesis is directed towards anyone with a rudimentary understanding of 
military operations. It will focus primarily on developing an understanding of deception 
principles and practices and integrating those practices into strategic doctrine.  The 
relationship between the principles and practices displayed in the case studies will be 
8 
compared to those within the Department of Defense, testing the viability of the 
framework presented by joint doctrine.  The ultimate goal is to develop a common 
framework for successful deception campaigns, based on two case studies.  The intent is 
to expose the readers to the case studies, provide resources for further education, and 
prepare someone for future assignments in deception planning and implementation.   
The methods of strategic deception employed by Germany and Iraq to mask their 
weapons programs from neighboring countries are discussed throughout the thesis with 
special emphasis placed on the associated successes and challenges.  Documents used 
span the range from secondary sources, such as reports from the CIA and books from 
leading authors to primary sources such as books and interviews with those directly 
involved in either the campaigns themselves or the efforts to unravel them.   
 
E. METHODOLOGY 
Since the end of the Cold War, most writings directly related to deception have 
been reflective in nature, offering little insight into the future of such operations. There is 
a plethora of documentation regarding the German interwar rearmament campaign.  More 
recently, there is an endless amount of information available on Iraq’s efforts to hide the 
true nature of their weapons programs.  Identifying relevant, objective information that 
adequately reflected the topic at hand seemed a daunting task.  The sources used are 
discussed below. 
 
1. Secondary Sources 
Both the Second World War and the more recent war with Iraq have an 
extraordinary amount of secondary material.  Most of these works do not directly cover 
their respective deception campaigns, except to note their existence.  Although these 
works were helpful, they did not provide much comprehensive coverage.  An additional 
challenge was finding objective material on Iraq since the ongoing nature of that conflict 
keeps it politically charged.  There are a few items that directly cover the topic of 
deception that proved extremely helpful in understanding and building a deception 





2. Service Unit Doctrinal Publications 
Familiarity with Department of Defense publications on deception was integral in 
preparation for this thesis.  Knowing how the current doctrine on deception is written 
offers the chance to modify those writings based on lessons learned from these case 
studies.  The National Military Strategy and National Security Strategy provide insight at 
the highest levels about how military operations fit in the highest levels of strategy. 
Primary sources were then used to further narrow the focus and gain detailed information. 
3. Primary Sources 
The most valuable information on this topic came from primary sources.  From 
documented interviews with key players in both campaigns, such as Scott Ritter and Hans 
Blix, to the CIA “Duelfer Report” on Iraq, the primary sources help to paint a clearer 
picture of how the deception campaigns were waged.  In addition, members of the Joint 
Intelligence staff at US Central Command were extremely helpful in providing direction 
on where to look for additional source material.   
 
F. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II and III describe and analyze their respective case studies.  They 
examine the facets of information operations present in interwar Germany and Iraq, 
emphasizing the successes and failures of each campaign. 
Chapter IV is a comparative analysis of the two case studies.  It discusses the 
similarities, differences, and the relationships between the “net end effects.”  This chapter 
also provides the lessons learned from both cases.  It is here that we see the true value in 
studying the future of deception, keeping it alive as a critical skill for the military 
profession. 
The final chapter provides a summary of the information discussed throughout the 
thesis and some recommendations for further study.  It is important to not only 
understand the challenges of conducting successful deception operations, but realizing 
the consequences of success.  Only by learning the lessons of the past can we mitigate he 
challenges we face today and the emerging ones of the future. 
10 
 























                                                
II. REBUILDING THE REICH 
British officers are gentlemen, but French officers are not.  One day in 
1920, some of the Military Control Commission under a French and 
British Officer, came to the barracks of which I had charge.  They said I 
had a store of rifles concealed behind a brick wall, contrary to the terms of 
the peace treaty.  I denied this. ‘I give you my word of honor as a German 
officer,’ I said ‘that I have no rifles concealed in the barracks.’ Well, your 
British officer was a gentleman.  He accepted my word of honor and went 
away.  But the French officer was not a gentleman.  He would not accept 
my word of honor.  He pulled down the brick wall, and he took away my 
rifles.7
- Anonymous German officer, 1933  
 
A. BACKGROUND  
 Charlemagne first forged the unified German nation-state as the Holy Roman 
Empire from several Germanic tribes in the ninth century.  The Holy Roman Empire 
enjoyed political power on the European continent until it was dissolved by Napoleon a 
thousand years later, in 1805.8  Seven decades later, the stunning Prussian victory over 
the French at Sedan in 1871 once again precariously united the Germanic territories for a 
second time, giving rise to an era of bold, violent politics, and a power base remaining 
with the Prussian bourgeois, strongly rooted in the military.9  The success at Sedan 
enlivened a new offensive mindset in the German military, allowing the General Staff to 
prepare plans for a Kesselschlact, or a battle of encirclement, as a standard measure in 
major land conflict.  The unification of 1871 also enlivened a nationalist spirit that 
yearned for colonial power to match the other continental powers; however, the new 
German nation-state arrived on the scene of territorial colonialism as the other major 
European powers had already established the bulk of the undeveloped world as their own, 
leaving the fledgling Reich with little chance for quality expansion.10   As German aims 
 
7 Christopher J. Lamb, How to think about Arms Control and Disarmament, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:  
Prentice Hall, 1988), 135. 
8 Richard Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (New York:  Penguin Press, 2004), 3-4. 
9 Ibid., 9-13. 
10 Larry Addington, The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General Staff (New Brunswick, NJ:  Rutgers 
University Press, 1971), 12-17. 
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for expansion directly conflicted with other continental powers, the era of ultra-
nationalism culminated in 1914 with the onset of the First World War.  In August of that 
year, a dispute between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Serbia over the assassination 
of the Habsburg heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne gave the European powers pretense 
to implement their battle plans, with the tragic result being a costly four-year war of 
attrition.  Germany used Schlieffen’s iteration of the Kesselschlact to strike first, 
violating neutral Belgium.  This violation of neutrality caused France, Britain, and Russia 
to intervene on Belgium’s behalf, sinking all of Europe in a conflict that few 
governments (even Germany’s Kaiser Wilhelm II) wanted.  The German army swept 
deep into France in an effort to repeat the Sedan victory of 1871 before the Russians 
could mobilize in the east, or the British could mobilize in the west to halt their advance.  
Timetables did not work to their advantage, and the offensive was stopped short of its 
objective of encirclement, and though there were minor gains on both sides, the front of 
September 1914 never substantially reversed over the course of the war. 
 Although the end of the next four years saw the front lines in the West still on 
French and Belgian soil, the economic embargo by Great Britain forced capitulation by 
Germany and its allies.  Germany bore the brunt of reparation fines and acceptance of 
guilt under the Treaty of Versailles.  The treaty’s articles denied Germany most of its 
traditional vestiges of military might, limiting all facets of its armed forces to a skeleton 
defensive force.  It also stripped Germany of some of its more economically and 
strategically critical land on the eastern and western frontiers, to provide buffer areas 
between that nation and those of its adversaries (as well as returning the French province 
of Alsace-Lorraine, taken in 1871).  The conditions imposed by Versailles served to 
humiliate, and then infuriate, a proud people with a rich military heritage, setting the 
stage for Germany’s rearmament efforts, as well as the rise of the Third Reich in 1933.  
While Michael Mihalka believes that deception is the tradition of the German military11, 
it was rather the result of stripping away the true military tradition that caused Germany 
to deceive.  
The deception employed by Germany to mask its rearmament was not a 
monolithic contrivance.  Instead, facets of the military, political, and industrial  
11 Michael Mihalka, German Strategic Deception in the 1930s (Santa Monica:  RAND Corp, July 
1980), vii.   
13 
communities undertook collaborations or singular efforts to subvert the terms of 
Versailles.  Had the terms of Versailles been more forgiving, more enforceable, and 
fostered forgiveness and a return to normalcy rather than revenge, an environment 
conducive to deception might not have arisen from the ashes of war. 
The Allies chartered a commission to ensure Germany’s compliance with the 
mandated initial drawdown and preclude its massive industrial-military complex from 
illegally replacing the equipment and infrastructure necessary to conducting offensive 
operations.  However, Germany never intended on following the spirit of the treaty terms.  
Frequently, both the spirit and the letter were disregarded, often under the thinnest veils 
of deception and secrecy.  Thus, Germany was able to quickly lay the groundwork for 
developing a modern military, without the hindrances of replacing generations of 
obsolete equipment to which the victors of WWI were constrained.  This rapid 
development was only realized in 1935, when Adolf Hitler unilaterally abrogated the 
Versailles Treaty, and unveiled the Wehrmacht in its grandest form. 
 Even the victors, charged with monitoring and enforcing the harsh terms imposed 
on Germany under the Versailles treaty, eventually became apathetic to enforcing their 
own terms, or outright supported German efforts at rearmament, turning a blind eye to 
blatantly illegal efforts, ostensibly to help counter the rising menace of Soviet Russia.  
The leading powers of the League of Nations, weary of another confrontation such as that 
of 1914-1918, opted instead to let the Germans rebuild, even in the face of evidence that 
could have precipitated an intervention, preventing the Second World War. Thus, the 
Versailles Treaty terms forced the Germans’ hand, while the refusal of the member-states 
of the League of Nations to act decisively surrendered the initiative to Germany.  
Additionally, the fledgling Weimar Republic was ineffectual at keeping reins over the 
myriad of problems facing the German people. This combination of factors created an 
environment for Germany to remain, if not undetected, at the very least relatively 
unhindered during a massive rearmament campaign. 
 Germany’s deception campaign (actually an aggregate of multiple smaller 
campaigns), spanning virtually the entire interwar period from 1919 to 1939, appears to 
have been successful because it followed most of the principles of a deception campaign, 
and encompassed each of the instruments of national power:  diplomatic, military, 
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economic, and information.  There are distinct and key phases evident in the rearmament 
effort.  The first phase occurred during the initial implementation of the Versailles 
Treaty, when Germany acted to conceal certain capabilities and develop others while the 
Inter-Allied Control Commission operated within its borders. The next phase began with 
the exodus of that commission in 1926, ushering in an era of thinly-veiled rebuilding, 
until the abrogation of Versailles in 1935.  Following that act, Germany’s rearmament 
began in earnest, free from the cloak of secrecy; however, Germany shifted to foreign 
politics through deception, convincing other nations to believe Germany’s military to be 
stronger than it really was in order to reach territorial objectives relatively bloodlessly.  
However, as the national strategy shifted to overt hostilities in 1939, the deception 
campaign became detrimental to the overall strategy by becoming too believable, lacking 
sufficient substance to sustain a protracted war effort, ultimately leading to Germany’s 
defeat in 1945.  Ultimately, Hitler himself may have become the worst victim of 
Germany’s early victories in World War II, as his misplaced belief in the German war 
machine gave him the confidence to declare war against the Soviet Union and the United 
States in 1941.  Both moves eventually cost Hitler and Germany dearly, as these two 
nations would be the victors over the Reich only four years later. Largely, the deception 
campaign forced the Allies to ramp up wartime production to meet a perceived German 
threat that was much smaller than anticipated.  This paper will divide the deception 
efforts chronologically, examining the deception instruments utilized during each distinct 
period, from the implementation of the Versailles Treaty to the beginning of open 
hostilities in the Second World War in 1939, to determine how each period incorporated 
the principles of deception, and contributed to the successes and failures of the overall 
campaign. It will then examine how the effects of the deception campaign ultimately 
became detrimental to the German national strategy during the latter stages of the war. 
 
B. DISARMAMENT AND INITIAL REBUILDING:  1919-1926 
The terms of the Versailles Treaty were doomed to failure.  Even in a conflict as 
destructive and massive as the First World War, the victors could not possibly have 
expected a nation to accept defeat as utterly and totally as Great Britain and France 
deemed it necessary for Germany to do.  Foremost, the backbone of German military 
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might, its great General Staff, was dissolved.  The German army was restricted to 
100,000 men, out of which the officer corps was further limited to 4,000 individuals.    
Similar restrictions were placed on the Navy and police forces, and the existence of an 
Air Force was strictly prohibited in an effort to ensure complete disarmament.12  The 
treaty ordered the Germans to turn over millions of surplus weapons, shells, and vehicles 
to allied inspectors to be summarily destroyed.  The military-industrial complex that 
sustained the German war effort and employed millions of German civilians was ordered 
shut down.  Factories not able to produce civilian materials were ordered dismantled.  
Not only were the terms of the treaty itself harsh, but the Allies also resolved to maintain 
a strict economic embargo and blockade on Germany until the terms were carried out, 
exasperating an already flailing economy.  It was under these conditions that the Inter-
Allied Control Commission (I-ACC) entered Germany in September 1919. 
The military, under the direction of General Hans von Seeckt, immediately began 
to subvert the Armistice terms.  Using the terms to its advantage, the army, or 
Reichswehr, became highly selective, drawing mostly on those with extensive previous 
military experience and a favorable political background to serve in the new military, 
thus preserving much of the operational atmosphere enjoyed until 1918.  In open defiance 
of the treaty terms, the army and police maintained a trained reserve force; both sides 
openly acknowledged this force; however it remained an item of negotiation, thereby 
making the German military default victors.13  The General Staff became reincarnated as 
the Truppenamt, ostensibly to “handle the organizational and administrative affairs”14 of 
the Reichswehr; however, the divisions looked suspiciously similar to the staff divisions 
of 1918.  Additionally, the provisional army became the safe haven for experienced Air 
Force officers during the abolition of that service. 
Combining the survival needs of the military with those of the turbulent national 
tenor, von Seeckt sought to utilize veterans of the military in organizations not governed 
by the diminutive quotas placed on either the army or the national police.  These veterans 
were inserted into paramilitary groups, politically aligned against the growing threat of 
 
12 Treaty of Peace with Germany (Washington:  GPO, 1919), pp. 66-87. 
13 Bart Whaley, Covert German Deception (Frederick, MD: University Publications, 1984), 21. 
14 Ibid., 20. 
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Bolshevism.  These groups, the forerunners of the Storm Troopers and Hitler’s SS, 
boasted more than one million armed and trained members by the end of 1926.15  These 
groups received arms and other support from the military, including arms ordered 
destroyed or surrendered under the terms of Versailles.   
The navy, too, was placed under strict limits by Versailles.  Capital ships were 
limited in tonnage to those ships well towards obsolescence, and submarines, the stalwart 
of the German fleet, were banned altogether.  In keeping with the propensity of the Allies 
to violate maritime construction treaties (the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 was 
violated by all of its signatories), the German navy rebuilt its surface fleet, to a lesser 
degree, concentrating more on rebuilding its fleet of submarines.  With the restrictions 
levied by Versailles, parity with England was still a virtual impossibility atop the 
waves.16
For as much as the German military found itself constrained by the provisions of 
Versailles, German industry was only bound to those provisions while within the German 
borders.  German corporations that could not diversify their production lines moved to 
other nearby countries sympathetic to German aims, such as Sweden, Austria, and the 
Netherlands.  In essence, this expansion broadened the scope of German industry, and 
allowed technological developments to be tried legally outside of Germany before the 
designs were shelved for production within the Fatherland, in accordance with the 
conditions of the Versailles Treaty.  The true legacy of this early period was the emphasis 
placed on research and development, as opposed to mass production.  This allowed 
Germany to develop cutting edge weapons, without the constraints of generational or 
iterational development.17
Krupp, the huge industrial empire that supported German military might, served 
as the cornerstone for the German rearmament machine, combining both expansion and 
diversification into a new corporate slogan:  “Wir machen Alles!” (“We make 
everything!”).18  The new Krupp line of items ranged from household goods, such as 
 
15 Bart Whaley, Covert German Deception (Frederick, MD: University Publications, 1984), 23. 
16 Ibid., 28. 
17 Williamson Murray, Strategy for Defeat:  The Luftwaffe 1933-1945 (Maxwell AFB: Air University 
Press, 1983), 2-3. 
18 Ibid., 10. 
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baby carriages and appliances, to heavy equipment, such as dredgers and farm vehicles; 
the latter category bearing a suspicious resemblance to military heavy equipment.  To that 
end, Krupp’s engineers and production managers for heavy weapons and armor, once the 
production lines for those particular items were dismantled, were given transfers to 
subsidiaries, such as Bofors, in Sweden, to work on similar production lines there.  Krupp 
was highly successful in these ventures, and designs for the next generation antiaircraft 
guns, artillery, and light tanks found buyers among the Danes, the Dutch, and the 
Swedish.  Hiding research and development divisions proved extraordinarily easy.  While 
members of the I-ACC and the international press concentrated on searching for treaty 
violations in obvious venues, more often than not, simple offices hidden in plain sight, 
with fairly obscure names, such as “Koch and Kienzle (E)”19, provided simple, yet 
effective cover for developmental operations of Krupp. 
The aircraft industry had comprised about fifty-five manufacturers and was utterly 
dismantled under the initial conditions of Versailles.  The manufacturers who remained 
endured migration and diversification to maintain their business.  When the restrictions 
were eased in 1921, only four of those original manufacturers remained.  One of the 
migrated companies, Fokker, whose F-7 biplane was the only category of German fighter 
called out by name in Versailles, first tried expanding its manufacturing expertise into 
canoes and then commercial scales, both of which proved financially disastrous.  All the 
while, the 28-year old multi-millionaire owner, Tony Fokker, plotted to conceal and 
move his aircraft works from under the eyes of the I-ACC inspectors.  In a complicated 
maneuver that lasted seven weeks, Fokker smuggled more than eight million dollars in 
equipment and finished product (220 airplanes and more than 400 aircraft engines) on 
350 railway cars, into Holland.  Once established in that country, he immediately co-
opted a Dutch order placed with the British, replacing the British craft with the same 
number of his own aircraft.  The British were unsuccessful in efforts to prevent the sale 
by proving that the aircraft were illegal.  Other manufacturers remaining within German 
borders were less subtle.  Depending on German escorts for forewarning, the inspectors 
 
19 Williamson Murray, Strategy for Defeat:  The Luftwaffe 1933-1945 (Maxwell AFB: Air University 
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of the I-ACC often arrived at potential sites of violations to empty warehouses, which 
only hours before had been bustling centers of rearmament.20
The German military-industrial complex even enjoyed a measure of support from 
an unlikely ally, the Soviet Union.  The Treaty of Rapallo in 1922 opened German bases 
on Soviet soil.  From these bases, the Germans were allowed to openly test new designs 
of aircraft and land vehicles, free from the eyes of the I-ACC inspectors. 21
Rather than a structured campaign, the deception efforts during this period 
comprised of an odd mix of industrial and military subterfuge whose objective was to 
ensure the survival of key manufacturing capabilities, critical materiel, and personnel 
with necessary professional skills.  While the actual objective for the industrial 
components largely focused on continued profits, aircraft manufacturer Heinkel once 
remarked that the game of “hide and seek” played with the I-ACC held much appeal.22  
This conveys an undertone that the nationalist sentiment that caused World War I did not 
abate with Versailles, but instead was amplified from a loathing of the armistice terms, 
and provided a clear set of adversaries upon which to channel this animosity. 
The focus of deception efforts throughout the campaign was the political decision 
makers for the Allied nations, with their primary intelligence-gathering conduit, the I-
ACC, serving as the primary target.  At every turn, the I-ACC found itself hamstrung by 
the Allied decision to allow the Germans to determine the escort officials for the 
inspection teams.  These escort agents were the eyes and ears for the military and 
industrial magnates colluding against Versailles.  Many times, the Germans would allow 
smugglers or weapons caches to be “found,” but, more often than not, escorts allowed 
smugglers to successfully cover, conceal, or relocate German capabilities from the 
inspection teams.  Although many inspectors noted concerns that the German government 
was being less than completely open, these warnings fell on deaf ears elsewhere on the 
continent.  Any concerns noted, much like the British protest at the Dutch aircraft order 
from Fokker’s shadow company, were either too difficult to prove, or bogged down in 
negotiations.23
 
20 Herbert Mason, Jr, The Rise of the Luftwaffe (New York: Dial Press, 1973), 75. 
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While it seems an impossible proposition to keep such a diverse effort 
coordinated and integrated, industry and military worked well at doing just that.  Von 
Seeckt and the industrial magnates colluded more often than not, allowing free flow of 
personnel between industry and military.  Such integration served as the basis for 
developing Germany’s military after 1935.  As the I-ACC slowly lost support from the 
League of Nations, integrating deception between industry and the government proved 
increasingly easy under its nose, as demonstrated largely by Krupp.24
Since centralized control was at least as difficult, if not more so, than integration, 
ad hoc control of deception efforts, typically considered a hindrance, actually served 
German purposes.  The lack of central control between organs of military and industry 
provided the government and businesses with plausible deniability during instances 
where the deception efforts were uncovered, further preventing the likelihood of 
intervention from the Allies.  While von Seeckt provided the foundation for central 
control, his involvement beyond the military realm was more coordinating than 
controlling.  This diversity in execution also allowed the security and timeliness aspects 
of each individual deception effort to be tailored to meet the needs of each military or 
industrial activity. 
Generally speaking, the security functions of the deception campaign involved 
providing misinformation.  Members of the international press, conducting visits to 
suspected rearmament sites, were welcomed with open arms.  Upon leaving, however, the 
journalists would find any film in their cameras irradiated or otherwise ruined, lest any 
details in their photographs provide proof of subterfuge.  Suspected agents of foreign 
intelligence organizations, or internal security risks (such as the burgeoning Socialist 
movement) suffered unfortunate “accidents.”  In other instances, the foreign press 
actually contributed to the sway of world opinion for the Germans, by over-reporting 
suspected violations.  The actual instances of German violations were lost in the din of 
those accusations lacking substance.  Many articles, when faced with undeniable proof of 
falsehood, required the press outlets to offer a public retraction or apology.  Thus, the 
cases of false positives left the world community questioning the true cases.25
 
24 William Manchester, The Arms of Krupp (Boston:  Little & Brown, 1968), 354. 
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For this phase, adherence to the principles of deception enhanced the success of 
the strategic objectives.  A total, coordinated deception effort would be difficult to 
maintain under the watchful eyes of inspectors.  Instead, the loose conglomeration of 
conspirators could easily keep watch over their own sheep, and maintain a level of 
deniability in any grander schemes. This allowed the German rearmament efforts to 
remain just stealthy enough to warrant repeal of the I-ACC charter in 1926, giving tacit 
approval for Germany to continue rearming under very tenuous cover.  Once the 
inspectors were out of Germany, the Allies further loosened their grip, later to their 
dismay.  In his piece, The Arms Race, Nobel peace laureate Philip Noel-Baker eloquently 
noted that “the system of inspection [did not] fail in Germany, but simply that after 1925 
it was never enforced.”26
 
C.  SUSTAINED COVERT REARMAMENT:  1926-1935 
In 1926, an Anglo-French agreement orchestrated by impatient foreign ministers 
Chamberlain and Briand relieved Germany of the burden of the I-ACC.  The bulk of their 
impatience stemmed from the incongruity between intelligence from their military 
advisors that Germany continually violated the terms of the Versailles Treaty, and the 
decided lack of evidence by the inspectors to corroborate that intelligence.  Thus, after 
months of negotiations, the I-ACC was ordered to withdraw in early 1927.  Its final 
report noted that Germany had “never disarmed, never had the intention of disarming, 
and for seven years had done everything in her power to deceive and ‘counter-control’ 
the Commission.”27  Although this report was consistent with the facts (in retrospect) and 
supported by military intelligence organizations, the evidence was summarily discounted 
by continental politicians, such as Chamberlain and Briand, who were ready to move 
forward from the memory of the previous decade.  To paraphrase Toynbee, the 
“statesmen” knew better than the “experts.”28   With the inspectors gone, the League of 
Nations lacked any enforceability in maintaining the Versailles terms.  In fact, despite 
substantial information shared between the I-ACC final report and intelligence reports 
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from British and French agencies, Germany was admitted to the League of Nations in 
September of 1926. 
The first seven years of this period saw little change in the conduct of German 
deception.  With the exodus of the inspectors, some facets of the deception campaign 
were able to act more overtly, such as the separated research and development divisions 
of the arms industry.  While the R&D efforts could continue, now unhindered, the 
political climate was still not prepared, inside Germany, or outside, or overt rearmament, 
yet strides continued to prepare for this eventuality. 
Early in this period, the military intelligence branch formed (in violation of 
Versailles) for each service was absorbed by the Truppenamt.  This intelligence service 
held very few successes, save the increased aerial reconnaissance conducted over Britain, 
Poland, and France.  The paramilitary “reserves” formed immediately after Versailles 
took shape as the new Chancellor, Adolf Hitler, authorized the military to take charge of 
the largest of those organizations, which were then trained as a reserve force.  Hitler also 
formed the National Labor Service and the Hitler Youth, providing training and 
preparation to millions of German youths.  While the Labor Service held compulsory 
terms for young men as early as 1934, the Hitler Youth boasted 3.5 million members 
while it was still voluntary.  Hitler then wrote a blank check for the German military, 
clandestinely authorizing outright rearmament in 1934.  This provided the opportunity for 
German industry to realize the manufacturing potential it developed and designed over 
the previous 15 years, and pulled German labor from the Great Depression. 
The funding for initial German rearmament came in the form of soft currency 
issued by the government, or hard currency in the form of seized, then liquidated assets 
of enemies of the state.  Both methods were extremely easy for the minister of the 
economy, Hjalmar Schacht, to hide; and conversely difficult for observers outside of 
Germany to track.  International concerns further helped in hiding the money trail.  The 
subsidiaries and partners of German corporations in Holland and Sweden were less likely 
to provide information to foreign press or intelligence outlets.  These same governments 
shared in the profits made by those corporations, making them tacit partners in 
Germany’s rearmament. 
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The German navy, after Hitler’s ascension to the chancellorship, began in earnest 
to rebuild its submarine fleet.  An immediate order for six vessels was placed, and 
groundwork was laid for a program to produce twelve more annually.  The keel was also 
laid for Germany’s capital ships, such as the Bismarck.  These vessels were well outside 
the allowed tonnage boundaries; however, any inspection that postulated this deception 
was attributed to design flaws by the Germans.  Since every other signatory of the 
Washington Naval Pact conducted similar violations, these violations went unchallenged. 
For the banned Air Force, 1926 saw the passing of the Paris Air Pact, which 
allowed Germany to manufacture planes consistent with the designs of contemporary 
fighter aircraft for the purposes of commercial and civilian competition, advertising, and 
transportation.  Competition aircraft bore remarkable resemblances to future Luftwaffe 
models while transport planes resembled future medium-range bombers and military 
transports.  Additionally, before von Seeckt’s forced retirement in 1926, he took steps to 
establish the Lufthansa with a substantial number of former military pilots.  So, training 
continued for pilots in the commercial realm.  Flight schools established throughout 
Germany were covers for military training facilities.  By 1934, over forty of these 
facilities existed.  One of the major accomplishments of German “civilian” aviation was 
breaking the altitude record at 41,000 feet.  This allowed safe over flight of Poland, 
Britain, and the Soviet Union, not only in violation of Versailles, but also violating 
treaties signed in the mid-1920s with Poland forbidding any over flight or aerial 
photography. 
In 1933, Hitler pulled off his first major rearmament coup in the international 
community, publishing in the German press that foreign aircraft had flown over Berlin.  
The chancellor then appealed to the international community that defense was 
impossible, since Germany had no operational Air Force.  The British obliged by 
supplying engines for a limited number of “police planes.”29  With support from the 
Soviet Union waning, Germany entered into an agreement with Italy in 1933 to establish 
training bases for pilots, allowing them to close bases established on Russian soil in the 
early 1920s. 
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As previously stated, this phase consisted of stepping up preparations for full-
scale rearmament.  The focus remained on decision-makers in France, Great Britain, 
Russia, and elsewhere, who would intervene and begin again to enforce Versailles.  The 
intelligence agencies of these nations were grossly under manned and under funded, 
largely due to the Great Depression.  As Germany simply stopped publishing lists of 
officers (as other European powers still did), French and British intelligence could not 
determine the German order of battle, nor could they perceive that the Germans had 
broken the Versailles-mandated numbers of officers.30
The German objective remained concealment of clandestine weapons programs, 
and subtle negotiation to gradually gain favorable concessions.  Should any of the Allies 
find credible, substantial evidence of German rearmament, inspections or interventions 
might occur to preclude such activity.  As the record shows, the Germans were largely 
successful in both of these objectives.  Very little credible evidence came out through 
intelligence or the media.  Toynbee’s “statesmen” immediately discounted the evidence 
that did arise.  These men were more bent on perceiving peace and normalcy than 
observing events as they were.  In fact, Hitler and Goering used obliging members of the 
foreign media to blindly report false information about Germany’s weapons programs.  
Ironically enough, these same reporters were the first ones notified of the existence of the 
German military only months later.31
Control, loose as it was during the first period of rearmament, gradually became 
more coordinated and centrally executed, especially once Hitler’s regime assumed power 
in 1933.  In 1934, Hitler established a directorate for rearmament to coordinate the 
development of the German military.  This centralized control also aided security efforts.  
Security consisted of laundering rearmament monies, keeping operational security over 
manufacturing and training, and preventing any outside influences from divulging 
information.  In addition to keeping classified information from foreign intelligence and 
media sources, members of the parliament and other governmental agencies were 
required to be kept in the dark, lest they make inadvertent disclosures.  Such disclosures 
happened in the early 1920s, causing considerable frustration to efforts at concealing 
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rearmament. Accordingly, by 1935, deception efforts could be effectively integrated, with 
industrial, military, and governmental players in close collusion. 
The importance of timeliness in this phase diminished, as spot inspections were 
eliminated early on.  Thus, the timetables for concealment deception efforts did not 
matter as much, and increased concessions offered to Germany injected an element of 
confusion as to what allowances were really being made.  However, efforts at 
maintaining a façade of non-aggressive intentions required a certain level of timeliness in 
order to make sure that the right people, such as media and dignitaries, observed the right 
event, such as staged parades and factory tours. 
This phase more closely followed the framework for successful deception.  As the 
threat of allied inspections diminished, the deception effort became much easier to 
conduct in a singular fashion.  Further enhancing the success during this phase was the 
propensity of foreign diplomats to neglect the evidence of their appointed representatives, 
in favor of allowing concessions to loosen the grip of Versailles.  As this loosening 
became increasingly evident, the path was cleared for Hitler to unilaterally reject 
Versailles in 1935, beginning a period of open rearmament.  With this open rearmament, 
German deception shifted from a strategy of concealment to a strategy of bluffing the 
world community into thinking Germany stronger than it actually was. 
 
D. OVERT REARMAMENT, DIPLOMACY BY BLUFF:  1935-1939 
In March of 1935, the last semblances of compliance with Versailles were 
shrugged off as Hitler proclaimed universal conscription with the purpose of building 
Germany’s army from a 100,000-man defense force to a war machine of 550,000.  The 
Wehrmacht was born.  However, as the majority of the last 15 years had been spent in 
research and development, the military was not yet prepared for a full-scale conflict.  By 
1935 Wehrmacht estimates, the German military would not be prepared for war until 
1942 or 1943.  However, the political agenda of the new regime would not wait.  Rather, 
Hitler switched Germany’s deception from feigning weakness to feigning strength.  Since 
the world had largely neglected to pay attention to Germany, the sudden appearance of a 
German military seemed out of thin air.  The results served to intimidate the European 
powers, keeping them at bay during Germany’s bids for expansion, until the Wehrmacht 
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was strong enough for a “final struggle” against mortal enemies France, Russia, and 
Great Britain.32
The first evidence of this new intimidation by a ghost military came in the form of 
convincing Great Britain that Germany had developed a numerical superiority over the 
Royal Air Force.  Immediately after the unveiling of the Wehrmacht, Hitler announced to 
the British attaché that the Luftwaffe had achieved parity with the RAF.  However, 
according to the actual numbers of British aircraft, the Luftwaffe enjoyed thirty percent 
superiority.33  Indeed, this proved to be just a smokescreen as the Luftwaffe had barely 
half of the RAF’s available aircraft, and large portions of those were prototype aircraft.  
Yet, the Germans provided further proof with a succession of demonstrations of German 
airpower.  These demonstrations, boasting over 400 aircraft in the Berlin sky, were 
actually unarmed, obsolete, or repeat flyovers with different squadron colors.  
Subsequently, this capability was further showcased in the media, and in successive visits 
by dignitaries from France and Great Britain, who regaled leaders at home with tales of 
German invincibility; Hitler’s strategy was bearing fruit. 
In reality, the Luftwaffe was grossly unprepared for this display.  The Germans 
lacked the financial capital and the natural resources to quickly produce aircraft, 
munitions, and parts in the quantities proscribed by Hitler’s deception campaign.34  
Although they could ostensibly not easily attack France or Great Britain without a long-
range capability, the traditional notion of requiring ground troops to win a war remained 
steady.  Luftwaffe planners, many of whom were groomed within the German Army, thus 
decided to forsake the idea of strategic bombing in favor of ground support and strike 
bombers, such as the Junkers Ju-87, and sleek, dominating fighters, such as 
Messerschmitt Bf-109 and the Focke-Wulf Fw-190.  These aircraft propagated the myth 
of Luftwaffe dominance by continuing to take competitive awards throughout 1935-
1937.35  Although it had a formidable capability for air superiority and ground support, 
the Luftwaffe still lacked a capability to strike at great distances.  This would prove to be 
a fatal flaw in Luftwaffe doctrine during the Battle of Britain in 1940. 
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The Wehrmacht received its first opportunities to prove itself less than a year after 
its existence became public knowledge.  In early March 1936, the German army occupied 
the demilitarized Rhineland.  Hitler publicly threatened to send six divisions;36 however, 
the army only had a single operational division.  With their intelligence telling them that 
the Germans maintained more than 265,000 troops in the Rhineland, the French refused 
to face the Germans without aid from the British.37  This allowed Germany to retake 
territory lost in Versailles without a fight.  Before overt hostilities began in September 
1939, Germany had also taken Austria, and bullied Great Britain and France into 
allowing German annexation of Czechoslovakia.  Cowed by the facade of German 
military might, those nations chose to appease Hitler in a conference in Munich in 1938 
which proved an unsuccessful attempt to sate Germany’s appetite for expansion.38
The true failure of Munich lies in the inability of the combined Allied intelligence 
organs to adequately determine German troop strength.  Great Britain, France, and 
Czechoslovakia enjoyed a two-to-one advantage over the Wehrmacht; however, French 
intelligence estimated that Germany was capable of fielding 120 divisions to match the 
combined strength of 140 divisions that the French and Czechs could mobilize.39  Had 
the Allies been able to determine the true strength of the Wehrmacht, it is plausible to 
assume that they could have either refused to concede to Germany at Munich, or 
adequately mounted a counterstrike and repelled Germany from the occupied lands.  
Hitler used his adept propaganda machine to exploit the desire of the European powers to 
avoid a costly war.  Alas, it was not to be.  Although the German expansion in 1938 
stopped at the Sudetenland, the rest of Czechoslovakia would fall within another year. 
Also during this period, the Wehrmacht sent a legion of “volunteers” to aid the 
revolt led by Franco in Spain.  The deception of a “volunteer” force was thin, but allowed 
for plausible deniability on the diplomatic front.  Even so, over the next three years, the 
German military gained valuable combat experience, in displays that were proudly touted 
across the globe as German.  One of the more disturbing images to arise from that 
conflict was the German destruction of the Basque town of Guernica.  Immortalized by 
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painter Pablo Picasso, Guernica’s legacy was to further heighten the perception that 
German military might was frightening and invincible.  Hugely successful in training 
personnel and developing tactics, the Germans suffered losses in materiel that would later 
prove costly.  The air contingent lost 96 of 106 aircraft, and the campaign cost Germany 
over $200 million.40
German foreign policy of deception reached its pinnacle in late summer of 1939.  
Against the wishes of the highest leadership of the Wehrmacht, Hitler engaged the 
German military on further expansion aims, beginning with an invasion of Poland.  To 
prepare for this invasion, Hitler pursued a non-aggression pact with Stalin, removing the 
Soviets from the list of supporters of Poland.  Once secured, Hitler orchestrated a pretext 
of a territorial dispute over the Versailles-proclaimed “international city” of Danzig to 
artificially create tension with the Poles.  This culminated in a radio declaration early on 
1 September that Polish forces had crossed into German territory, violating the non-
aggression pact shared by those two countries.  In reality, there was no such Polish 
invasion; rather, members of the German military had dressed in Polish uniforms and 
“invaded” the border city of Gleiwitz, taking over a radio station and murdering an 
“innocent civilian.”41  As a result of the “invasion,” the German military had crossed into 
Poland more than an hour before Hitler’s broadcast.  The intent of this message was 
presumably to give Great Britain and France the opportunity to gracefully reject their 
obligations to support Poland.42   
Later that same day, Hitler orchestrated his final pre-war deception effort, aiming 
to keep an international intervention from defending Poland.  He announced that 
Germany had spent “more than 90 billion reichsmarks” on building the Wehrmacht as the 
“best equipped armed forces in the world.”43  Unfortunately for Hitler and Germany, 
Great Britain and France joined the conflict within 48 hours, launching another global 
conflagration that would see the end of the Third Reich. 
In addition to focusing deception efforts on the decision makers and diplomats of 
countries outside of Germany, the German people themselves were also targets.  Largely, 
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this was accomplished not only through intelligence coups, feeding those organizations 
misinformation, but also through media reporting, strategically orchestrated to convey the 
message of German might.  The objective in targeting decision makers changed from 
keeping them from intervening in Germany’s rearmament efforts to convincing them of 
Germany’s military might, keeping those nations from intervening in Hitler’s foreign 
expansion initiatives.  The objective in targeting the German people served to heighten 
support for Hitler’s regime, by convincing the people that Germany had returned to 
global pre-eminence, and elevating them from the squalor imposed by the combined 
effects of Versailles and the Great Depression.  If the German people believed in the 
cause, they would more readily support increasing escalation of a conflict of conquest. 
Hitler and his closest advisors increasingly exercised direct control over strategic 
development during this period.  As the deception took on a flavor of diplomacy, rather 
than concealment, it is only natural that the head of state and his closest confidants 
conducted the bulk of the deception.  This provides the ultimate in security, as few people 
actually know what is occurring. For the military’s part, the German general staff was 
complicit in demonstrating German might, although they did not understand the 
immediacy of Hitler’s aims abroad.  Their projections hinged on the estimate of readiness 
for war in the early 1940s, rather than the end of the 1930s.  Most importantly, security 
during this period required ensuring that the intended audience(s) heard only the message 
that the state provided.  Unlike the previous periods, where using a plethora of confusing 
messages to obfuscate the issue served German aims, doing so here would be dangerous 
to achieving diplomatic goals by making the other nations doubt German claims. 
Timeliness of deception efforts continued to play a critical role during this period.  
Visual displays, proclamations, and media stories were timed to coincide with each other, 
resulting in a maximum effect.  For example, aerial displays were timed to match up with 
visits by British and French foreign ministers, who were then fed falsehoods about 
German production capacities.  Upon their return to their respective countries, media 
outlets had printed complementary stories from other parts of Germany.  These all served 
the singular goal of painting a picture to the European powers of a German juggernaut.44
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Likewise, integration was critical to ensure that all parts were planned and 
meshed well together.  Unlike the previous strategy of concealment, where integration 
can make allowances for tailoring deception to meet circumstances, deception through 
diplomacy requires all parts to be completely cohesive. 
The framework for deception was strictly adhered to during this period.  All 
criteria developed for a successful campaign were met.  Additional consideration must be 
given during this period, as in the last, to the propensity of foreign officials to trust what 
they had been fed, rather than verify German claims through intelligence.  However, for 
the German’s part, their demonstrations of power were more than convincing.  As we will 
see, this deception, in fact, was too convincing, as the Germans (notably Hitler) were 
lulled into the false sense of invincibility, leading to their ultimate defeat. 
 Until this point in the deception campaign, there was little need for terminating 
the deception.  Deception efforts reaped extraordinarily more benefits than anyone could 
have possibly imagined, as a ghost army induced capitulation of large amounts of 
territory without an actual fight. However, this point in the campaign, ending with the 
invasion of Poland, proved the optimal time for the termination of the deception 
campaign.  Had Hitler left the table with his earnings after Munich, and let the myth of 
German supremacy continue to propagate and result in diplomatic gains, while he 
continued to build his actual military might, the next six years might have been 
dramatically different.  However, the success of German deception, culminating in early 
military victories in Poland and France, lulled Hitler into a sense of invincibility.  Caused 
by failing to terminate the deception campaign, his self-deception caused the German 
military to over-extend its resources over the next few years, culminating in defeat at the 
hands of the Allies in 1945.   
 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
Germany was able to conduct a successful deception campaign because numerous 
factors created an environment conducive to running an extensive deception campaign.  
Accepting defeat following the First World War, followed by the terms of the Versailles 
Treaty, humiliated the German people, a people with a proud military heritage.  
Additionally, Germany was able to tap into the fear of European nations that the carnage 
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of 1914-1918 might be revisited so soon after that war had ended.  Both of these 
conditions laid the groundwork for successful deception.  The lack of ability among the 
League of Nations, members of which imposed such harsh conditions, to enforce the 
treaty terms, aided this deception.  With the rise of Adolf Hitler and the subsequent 
abrogation of Versailles, the deception of the 1920s facilitated Hitler’s diplomacy of 
deception. 
The global community’s complacency permitted German rearmament.  Not only 
did leaders and diplomats discount the work of their own intelligence agencies, but they 
also refused to listen to the reports of the inspection agencies.  This utter refusal to accept 
the notion that Germany would be capable of rearming when the rest of the continent still 
reeled from the war of the previous decade colored their perceptions, and served to build 
perceptual biases on the part of the Allied leaders.  These perceptions, forged by disbelief 
of Germany’s ability to rearm, surprisingly shifted to ready acceptance that it had indeed 
taken place.  Indeed, this contributed to the overall success of Hitler’s foreign policy by 
developing the myth of a Wehrmacht juggernaut, unbeatable and unbreakable.  This 
juggernaut myth allowed Germany to bloodlessly take over lands before 1939. After the 
invasion of Poland, quick, easy victories over the Allies further propagated this myth. 
At the onset of the deception campaign, it did not closely follow the framework 
for successful deception, due to the diverse nature of the entities seeking to subvert 
Versailles.  The government and industrial players in early subversion of Versailles each 
had their own reasons for wanting to deceive the Allies.  Obviously, the government 
(mainly the military) wished to maintain a strong German military force.  The industrial 
leaders largely wished for survival; however, there is evidence that they also found 
pleasure in the thought of restoring German might.45 Had the military and industry been 
in close collusion earlier in the campaign, it surely would have warranted immediate 
intervention by the League of Nations.  As it was, the gradual erosion of Versailles and 
the awarding of concessions to Germany allowed such collusion to happen much more 
frequently and openly.  With the departure of the inspection teams in 1926, this 
partnership became only thinly disguised, and the subsequent deception efforts more 
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closely met the principles of deception.  As the campaign shifted from arming Germany 
to establishing German supremacy, the deception efforts very closely mirrored the 
deception framework.   
The German deception from 1919 to 1945 failed to secure its objectives 
independent of the deception campaign.  During each phase, overall campaign success 
was contingent on the success of the deception.  This violates a basic deception planning 
principle, which dictates that overall success should at no time depend on the success of 
deception.  However, Germany had few alternative options. 
The rearmament campaign hinged on the success of the deception efforts.  At any 
time, if the Allies believed Germany to be rearming with enough voracity, it would have 
warranted an intervention and possible invasion, with Germany not being strong enough 
to repel it.  This made the subterfuge critical to the campaign.  Also, since the deception 
was largely successful, the overall rearmament campaign proved successful. 
Once the shift occurred from rearmament to deceptive diplomacy, the lack of a 
military that was as strong as advertised required the deception to achieve results where 
the military could not.  Surprisingly, the diplomatic deception worked extremely well, 
resulting in huge successes on the diplomatic front, including annexations of the 
Rhineland and Sudetenland.  However, as the diplomatic deception became increasingly 
successful, it resulted in deceiving the deceivers, causing the Germans to take 
progressively more risks, culminating in entering a war they could not win.  Even in 
entering this war in 1939, the tactical and technological innovations of the 1920s and 
1930s allowed them to conquer Western Europe before the lack of strategic airpower cost 
them the Battle of Britain in 1940.  These early victories reinforced the German 
deception campaign, propagating the myth of German invincibility, even among the 
German high command, largely contributing to the overall failure of German strategic 
goals. 
Another contributing factor to the German defeat was their inability to 
successfully terminate the deception campaign.  At the height of its success, following 
the capitulation of the French and British at Munich in 1938, a wiser move would have 
been to simply build their actual capabilities to match their simulated ones, a move that, 
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while time consuming, ensures they would be able to meet any calls to Hitler’s bluffing.  
By the Wehrmacht’s own estimates, this would have only taken an additional few years, 
allowing the myth of German supremacy to manifest itself further on the diplomatic front 
before any conflict took shape.  As it was, the failure of the Germans to terminate the 
campaign or develop capabilities to match their claims proved the catalyst leading to 

















                                                
III. BUILDING PRESTIGE THROUGH TERROR 
A tyranny based on … deception and maintained by terror must inevitably 
perish from the poison it generates within itself.46
– Albert Einstein 
 
A. BACKGROUND 
Iraq has a history steeped in numerous conquests and shaped by conflict among 
fragmented ethnic and religious populations.  However, while Germany often used the 
differences among their ethnic populations as a uniting factor, these differences have 
often been the catalyst for bloodshed among the peoples of Iraq.  Over the course of five 
millennia, from the time of the ancient civilizations (notably the Sumerians and 
Assyrians), to conquests by the Persians, Romans, Mongols, and finally the Ottoman 
Turks in the fifteenth century, the Mesopotamian lands have always been held by the 
strongest, most ruthless rulers. 47
The modern Iraqi state draws its origins from the conflict that eventually spawned 
the Nazi state in Germany.  At the Versailles conference, two lesser bureaucrats in the 
British and French governments developed an agreement between those two nations to 
divide the Middle Eastern lands under the rule of the Ottoman Turks, ostensibly as 
“protectorates,” administered under supervision until they could be prepared for 
independence and acceptance to the League of Nations.  However, those governments 
also made promises to earmark the same lands as a Zionist state in the Jewish holy lands 
and as an independent state, in order to win favor against Germany and the Ottomans.  As 
the war drew to a close, each group was eager for the Allies to fulfill their agreements; 
however, the colonial powers simply stripped the lands from the Ottomans and 
assimilated them into their own territorial aims under the previously mentioned guise of 
protectorate states.  The indigenous people to the region saw France and Great Britain as 
simply another conquering force blocking their path to self-determination.  Isolated from 
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the fragmented tribal clansmen of the ruling generation, a strong underground emerged 
among the new generation of political and military leaders, advocating the overthrow of 
the yoke of the Imperialist powers and the emergence of a unified Arab state.48
Two of these revolutionary proponents of an independent Arab state during this 
period were Syrian students Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar.  Educated under the 
strong socialist and communist influences of the French education system of the 1920s 
with contemporaries Pol Pot, Ho Chi Minh, and Vo Nguyen Giap, Aflaq and al-Bitar 
developed a political and social construct that continue to shape events in the political 
dynamic of Southwest Asia.  Drawing on the influences of the socialist and fascist 
governments emerging in Europe during the interwar period, yet rejecting the more 
Marxist philosophies that permeated French intellectualism of the time, they set out to 
create a system by which the ideals driving Arab culture could rise, free from decadent 
influence by the Western powers.  What arose was the basis for Baathism, a political 
ideology that would take hold once Aflaq and al-Bitar returned to Syria, before being 
forced to migrate to Iraq.  Baathism was attractive to more moderate Arab societies 
because, while it rejected Western social structures, it did not reject the need to adopt 
Western technology and science.  However, like other fascist and socialist ideologies of 
the time, it was extremely discriminative, and highly nationalist.49
The organizers of the fledgling Baath Party emulated the underlying structure of 
the Communist Soviets even if rejecting most of that ideology.  Drawing on centuries of 
blood feuds, unrest, and conquest, they played on the secretiveness and suspicion of the 
fragmented clans throughout the Middle East to build resilient, popular, and adaptable 
political organizations.  While the Baath Party was largely successful in Iraq and Syria, 
other nations, such as Egypt, also had smaller organizations.50
This popularity became increasingly evident after the end of the Second World 
War.  As the emerging United Nations focused on containing the spread of Communism 
looming across Europe and East Asia, Middle Eastern countries struggled to free 
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themselves from the shadow of European colonialism.  Baathism appealed to many 
because, unlike other Arab movements, it managed a tenuous balance between rejecting 
the governing colonial regimes, restoring a traditional Arab society, yet not rejecting 
centuries of advancement made by Western civilizations.  The rising generation of Arabs 
leaned increasingly towards the Soviet Union for support, instead of the Western powers 
that had perpetuated colonial aims on their lands.51
The skirmishes sparked by clashes between the new generation of Pan-Arabians 
and the colonial powers escalated throughout the 1940s and 1950s, continuing the 
perpetual upheaval that the region had seen for centuries when not under rule by a large 
empire.  The British-installed Caliphate ended in a brutal, bloody coup in 1958, sparking 
an exceptionally bloody five-year power vacuum.  One of the henchmen for the 
victorious “republican” Baath forces was a motivated Baathist named Saddam Hussein, a 
lower-level death squad thug from the central Iraqi city of Tikrit.  Hussein, whose 
primary father figure was an uncle who was a fervent admirer of Hitler and Nazi anti-
Semitism, found his niche in the Baath Party.  Seizing a potential opportunity for 
advancement, Hussein latched onto Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr, one of the major players in 
the armed forces of the new republic, and slowly ascended to be the head of Iraq’s three 
secret police organizations.52
In July of 1979, Hussein initiated a coup of his own, convincing al-Bakr to step 
down, leaving Saddam with consolidated power and insatiable ambition for his country.  
Within his first week as president of Iraq, Saddam executed more than twenty senior 
Baath Party leaders for complicity in an alleged assassination plot, encouraging other 
members of the party leadership to join the firing squads.  These theatrics made a simple, 
clear point:  ultra-nationalism in the party is a minimum requirement, and no one is truly 
safe.  Immediately, Saddam increased his military spending, and undertook massive 
projects to rebuild lagging infrastructure in a bid to make Iraq a major global player.53
Despite the brutality, anti-Semitism, and terrorist leanings of the new Iraqi 
regime, the United States pledged support to Saddam to balance regional stability against 
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the Fundamentalist Islamic regime in Iran that overthrew the Shah in 1979.  Thus, when 
Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, the Western powers shunned by Iraq and regional powers 
offered monetary and equipment support;54 the United States itself provided 
intelligence.55  Worse, these same countries ignored Iraq’s use of chemical weapons 
against not only Iranian forces, but also opportunist Kurdish rebels in Northern Iraq.  The 
United Nations Conference on Disarmament chided Iraq for using such weapons, but 
imposed few substantive measures against Iraq for their use.56  This demonstration of 
willingness to use weapons of mass destruction would shape Western thought over the 
course of the next two decades, during which time Saddam’s regime continued its 
brutality, largely against his own people, as well as his pursuit of a nuclear, biological, or 
chemical capability.  This latter pursuit, and the consequent evasion of measures to 
prevent such programs from bearing fruit, is the focus of this case study. 
The Iraqi deception campaign to conceal weapons programs in these areas 
spanned a period of 21 years, from initial inspections of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) until the Iraqi declaration to the toppling of Saddam’s regime in 2003.  
This deception can be split into three distinct phases.  The first phase is the initial period 
of inspections under IAEA, during which time the Iraqi regime successfully prevented 
much of its material from being discovered.  Next, following the end of Desert Storm, the 
United Nations sent the United Nations Special Commission on Disarmament 
(UNSCOM), under David Kay, to more actively pursue Iraq’s programs.  This period 
lasted until late 1996, when Iraq made a full declaration of its weapons programs in order 
to gain the Oil for Food program.  This program ostensibly eased the suffering of the 
Iraqi people due to post-Desert Storm sanctions, but also allowed easier illicit transfer of 
goods and capital to willing participants.  The third phase, beginning at this point, was 
Saddam’s testing of U.N. resolve, negotiating to end Desert Storm sanctions against Iraq 
while offering little concessions to allow inspections.  This phase culminated in the 
cessation of Iraqi cooperation with UNSCOM and the expulsion of inspectors in 1999, 
and lasted until the fall of Saddam’s regime in 2003.  The failure of the Iraqi regime to 
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adequately terminate their deception campaign and provide incontrovertible evidence of 
the destruction of their weapons programs and capabilities resulted in the U.S.-led 
coalition invasion and the overthrow of the Iraqi regime. 
This chapter will discuss how each period provided the Iraqi regime with the 
notoriety it sought at the expense of its own people and its adversaries by developing 
programs in the nuclear, chemical, and biological arenas.  This chapter will also examine 
how successful campaign termination, manifested in the unconditional compliance with 
the United Nations-mandated, verification, and dismantling of Iraq’s WMD programs 
may have averted the crisis of 2003, which precipitated the coalition invasion.  Although 
the winter of 2002 saw Saddam open his doors completely, when it was evident that the 
United States would indeed conduct an invasion, Saddam had already backed himself 
into a corner from which he could not escape. 
 
B. DEVELOPMENT DURING THE 1980s 
In early June of 1981, Israeli aircraft conducted a unilateral strike on an Iraqi 
nuclear facility, built with cooperation by the French, and claimed by the Iraqis as simply 
for research purposes.  This facility, dubbed “Osiraq” by the French builders, was subject 
to regular inspection by the IAEA.  The IAEA sided with Iraq in finding that it would 
take the facility at least four to eight years to produce weapons-grade materiel.  This 
strike was a no-confidence vote on inspections, and was summarily condemned by a vast 
majority of the United Nations, to include the United States.  In retrospect, the obfuscated 
details surrounding the reactor at Osiraq prove that they were willing to deceive IAEA 
inspectors in their pursuit of WMD.57
The strike at Osiraq proved to be the culminating point in thirteen years of Iraqi 
pursuit of nuclear material.  The year 1968 marked an acceleration of Iraqi intentions to 
obtain or manufacture materials for atomic weapons.  Spearheading these efforts were 
Saddam Hussein, then still waiting for his eventual accession to the presidency.  
Organically, the Iraqis formed an atomic energy commission (IAEC) to organize these 
efforts under the direct supervision of the government’s executives.  Seeking aid from 
foreign nations, the IAEC found willing partners in the French and Soviet governments to 
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import equipment and materials.  Reportedly, these advances were merely to provide 
research and infrastructure to the Iraqi people.  However, by the time the Israelis struck in 
1981, the Iraqis had purchased enough materiel from nuclear nations to begin producing 
weapons-grade plutonium well ahead of the IAEA estimates.  Iraq declared none of these 
purchases or programs during IAEA inspections.58
Iraq also actively pursued biological weapons during the 1980s.  Efforts included 
developmental projects at universities within Iraq, disguised as research projects.  Strains 
of biological toxins and support equipment were ordered abroad.  By the time Desert 
Storm kicked off in 1991, the Iraqis had nearly 200 warheads containing biological 
agents, including Anthrax and Ricin; however, the Iraqis lacked a reliable long-range 
delivery agent.59  With the prevailing minds advising Saddam that the most effective 
mode of delivery would be crop dusters, the Iraqi biological weapons program became 
relegated to a deterrent weapon of terror (albeit a good one) rather than one of substantive 
“kinetic” effects.60
The Iraqi chemical weapons programs were an entirely different matter 
altogether.  In 1981, Iraq earned the dubious honor as the first nation to use chemical 
weapons against a battlefield enemy since the First World War, and the only one in 
history to use a nerve agent.61  It would be the first iteration of many, and not solely 
against foreign enemies of the state.  Before the end of the 1980s, Iraq had amassed a 
rather large stockpile of chemical weapons.62  Largely, the Iraqis could rely on artillery 
shells for tactical delivery of the agents, but as with the other two categories of weapons, 
there was a distinct lack of reliable ranged delivery systems.63
Not surprisingly, there seems to be very little substantive documentation of active 
concealment of Iraqi weapons programs during this period, possibly because the IAEA 
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and other intelligence organs were fairly ineffective on the ground.64  Although IAEA 
inspectors regularly operated within Iraq’s borders, they primarily focused on nuclear 
safeguards at declared facilities.  Iraqi deception consisted mostly of omission and 
avoidance.  Often, development sites would simply have to be named something else to 
escape inspection.  Had the IAEA mandate been more comprehensive, perhaps they 
would have uncovered Iraqi nuclear programs earlier.  In their defense, however, it is 
important to note that Iraq was engaged in a war with neighboring Iran, making it 
difficult at best to expect open cooperation with a rather invasive look into a working war 
machine.  Additionally, it seems difficult for a nation to conceal extensive deals for 
technology and raw materials with a myriad of foreign nations, as Iraq did, for materials 
related to WMD.  It would appear that a majority of the world community chose what 
they thought to be the lesser of two evils between fundamentalist Iran and seemingly 
progressive, pro-Western Iraq.  In some instances, such as with the Karl Kolb 
Corporation in Germany, international entities were to provide dual use technology and 
facilities65; providing dual use technologies ostensibly gave Iraq and Karl Kolb a 
measure of plausible deniability. 
The focus of Iraqi deception during this period was the decision makers within the 
United Nations Security Council who might thwart plans to develop weapons of mass 
destruction.  The IAEA and foreign intelligence agencies serve as the conduit by which 
information reaches those decision makers.  The objective was merely to confuse 
inspectors enough to keep them from discovering Iraq’s true capabilities, and hence, not 
to act against them. 
Iraqi weapons programs were under the complete and total control of Saddam 
Hussein.  According to all accounts by members of his regime, Saddam retained sole 
authority to approve the use of weapons of mass destruction.  In the same vein, he made 
all strategic decisions and the lion’s share of operational decisions.66  From a standpoint 
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of deception operations, this ensured that operations were integrated and fairly secure.  
Additional security is provided through the brutal nature of the regime.67
Timeliness played a crucial role in this period.  It was critical to ensure that 
inspectors or other observers were simply not at the right place in order to maintain 
concealment of the programs adequate for Iraqi purposes. 
After the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, Saddam sought to exert his designs on 
neighboring Kuwait, invading in 1990.  Unlike the war with Iran, the United Nations, 
spearheaded by the United States, would not let such an invasion stand.  During the 
build-up to the Kuwait invasion, Saddam broadcasted his WMD capability proudly, 
claiming that he would use such weapons against any adversary, chiefly Israel.  This 
statement was a realization of Baath Party anti-Semitism and rejection of Western 
society.  This declaration, with the ultimate Iraqi defeat in 1991 at the hands of a U.S.-led 
coalition force, signaled a watershed in the Iraqi weapons programs.  Saddam would shift 
from concealment of program location and a foreign policy of “threat of use” to 
concealment of program existence or capability during the 1990s. 
 
C. INSPECTIONS SUCCEED:  1991-1996 
With Iraq’s defeat in 1991 came a multitude of United Nations resolutions, 
aiming at ensuring the dismantling of Iraqi WMD programs.  These resolutions 
established the Special Commission on Disarmament (UNSCOM) as the vehicle by 
which compliance would be ensured.  For the Iraqi regime, a prohibition on the export of 
Iraqi oil until the inspectors verified compliance provided the incentive to cooperate.  
This sanction alone invariably crippled the Iraqi economy, dependent as it was on oil 
revenues.  Combined with the trade sanctions imposed upon Iraq immediately following 
their invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the potential increased for an epic humanitarian disaster 
to fall on the Iraqi people. 68
In theory, such sanctions should have induced a cooperative spirit from the 
regime, so that effects on the population a large would be minimal.  However, the regime 
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ensured that the population suffered the brunt of the sanctions.  This served to reinforce 
the idea that the West was responsible for their suffering, endearing the Iraqi regime to its 
people and hastening the possibility of a sympathetic reaction on the part of the world 
community.  
Unlike its predecessor body within the IAEA, UNSCOM had teeth.  Unlike the 
IAEA, UNSCOM reported directly to the Security Council.69  It was supported by a 
wealth of additional intelligence gathering tools and new technologies.  However, 
because only a handful of member nations were capable of providing skilled personnel 
and equipment, UNSCOM suffered from a different hindrance.  Many felt the limited 
makeup of the inspection body signaled a bias on the part of the inspectors, especially 
with regards to members from the United States.  This perception of bias served Iraq’s 
strategic purposes over the next several years.70
One of the most immediate discoveries made by the inspection teams was that the 
Iraqis had successfully (and covertly) enriched uranium, using methods dating back to the 
original atomic bomb.71  The facility, located near Tarmiya, had been destroyed by air 
strikes during Desert Storm.  Additional facilities also sustained crippling damage in 
those air strikes, including a “yellowcake” uranium plant.72  However, Iraq did not 
disclose much of the information surrounding their nuclear weapons programs in their 
initial disclosures during spring of 1991.  In fact, rather than disclose the program, the 
Iraqi military used banned chemical weapons to quell uprisings from the Kurdish and 
Shi’a populations in 1991.73  The head of the Iraqi Nuclear Program, presidential son-in-
law Hussein Kamil, ordered destruction of as much equipment, documents, and facilities 
in violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as possible, yet also ordered at least one set 
of documents to be retained by scientists for later use.  It was not until presented with 
inspection results from the initial round of UNSCOM inspections that the Iraqis admitted 
to the programs, and then turned over equipment for destruction later that year.  This 
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would actually set a benchmark for Iraqi cooperation, conditional as it was on UNSCOM 
finding evidence before the regime would declare the existence of the program.74  
Although much more inconvenient than willing disclosure, UNSCOM would prove quite 
adept at finding evidence.  This would eventually lead the Iraqis to further obstruct 
inspections. 
In addition to the Iraqi shell game of refusal to acknowledge programs until 
provided proof that inspectors had uncovered them, the Iraqis practiced active deception 
and concealment to, if not keep the programs afloat, to keep the personnel and materiel 
available to reconstitute them once inspections had ended.  Two clear examples of this 
practice involved IAEA inspector David Kay, who, in summer of 1991 provided the 
Security Council with two “smoking guns” to prove Iraq still intended to develop WMDs.  
The first was a forced inspection of a truck convoy containing machinery used to enrich 
uranium (calutrons), and the second was discovery of documents clearly stating Iraqi 
intentions.75  The Iraqis decried Kay, successful at his post, as a servant of the United 
States.  In addition, Kamil appointed scientists involved in the WMD programs in 
clusters to other “research” programs to provide a clear segue into reconstituting the 
programs once inspections and sanctions ended. 
The extent of this deception was made clear with the defection of Kamil in 1995.  
With him, he brought documentation on all of Iraq’s covert WMD programs.76  He also 
claimed that Iraq had indeed destroyed all stores of weapons banned by U.N. resolutions; 
however, he had no corroborating proof.77  Sensing the betrayal of his son-in-law, 
Saddam shortly thereafter “found” approximately twelve trunks full of paperwork 
regarding Iraq’s WMD programs, turning them over to the IAEA and UNSCOM 
inspectors.78  Persuaded to return to Iraq in 1996, Kamil was assassinated by the 
regime.79
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By most accounts, the gains resulting from Kamil’s defection signaled an end to 
any actual Iraqi WMD capability.  It is now widely known, however, that Iraq maintained 
a capability to restart its development programs; Saddam claimed as much in 1996, 
predicting that the inspections would not last much longer.  He took steps to further 
consolidate Iraqi industry under his direct control, organizing certain facets to facilitate 
an easy return to development and production of nuclear, biological, and particularly 
chemical weapons.  However, the predilection of Iraq to frustrate and obfuscate 
inspections perceivably colored the opinions of the Security Council powers and the 
inspection bodies.  This perception continued to manifest itself in the refusal of the 
Security Council to believe Iraqi claims of disarmament.  In the arena of WMDs, Hans 
Blix points out that it is a natural assumption that Iraqi evasion and obstinacy indeed 
masked weapons programs.80  Why hide something when there is nothing to hide?  
UNSCOM, IAEA, and the Security Council all fell prey to this belief.     
Iraq won a major concession in 1996 with its acceptance of the U.N. Oil for Food 
program.  Designed to relieve the Iraqi people of the humanitarian crisis caused by the 
sanctions resulting from the invasion of Kuwait, Oil for Food proved a chief vehicle by 
which Iraq, with extensive foreign collusion, would violate U.N. sanctions.  The besieged 
Iraqi people, planned beneficiaries of the Oil for Food relief, saw very little of it, as the 
majority of revenue went straight into the coffers of the regime.  Saddam used the illicit 
gains from Oil for Food to divert capital into his consolidation of industry and rebuilt a 
portion of his chemical capability destroyed in 1991.  In addition to subverting the Oil for 
Food program, Saddam solicited covert aid from regional and European powers in 
exchange for oil vouchers, making it possible for Iraq to defy U.N. sanctions and keep 
arming its military.  These vouchers, along with dummy corporations, laundered roughly 
twenty million dollars from 1996 through 2003.81  In keeping his military armed, Saddam 
paid close attention to air defenses, seeking to frustrate U.S. and British enforcement of 
“no-fly zones” in both the North and South of Iraq. 
Iraq used myriad efforts during this period to prevent inspections from uncovering 
actual intentions and capabilities.  By refusing to freely disclose information, the Iraqis 
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displayed a willingness to violate U.N. mandates from the moment Desert Storm ended.  
Disclosure only partially occurred once undisputable proof arose for each individual 
violation.  It was not until the defection of Hussein Kamil that Iraq fully disclosed its 
capabilities and programs, opening them for dismantling.  In essence, it was probably the 
success of the IAEA and UNSCOM inspections that forced Iraq to be as obstinate as they 
were in disclosing their programs.  Had the inspectors been as inept as the Iraqis 
perceived them to be during the safeguard inspections of the previous decade, the regime 
may not have been as hostile towards inspectors.  As it was, the efficiency with which the 
inspectors uncovered covert Iraqi programs at least partially caused Saddam’s regime to 
scramble for adequate (though often times thin) cover.  Although Kamil’s defection 
sparked the end of Iraq’s operational capability, the potential for reconstitution still 
remained in the form of intellectual capital.  The scientists and documents remained 
within Iraq, ready to restart work at Saddam’s word.  Also vital to the deception 
campaign was the illicit transfer of funding and material from Middle Eastern and 
European nations through the Oil for Food program, front corporations, and money 
laundering.82  These operations allowed Iraq to continually defy U.N mandates, biding 
their time until inspections and sanctions ended.  Although Iraq complied fully with the 
letter of the Security Council’s mandates in declaring its weapons programs, it retained a 
store of the intellectual capital necessary to restart its WMD programs once UNSCOM 
and IAEA left Iraq.83
During this period, the Iraqi deception was intended to conceal the continued 
existence of WMD programs from the inspection bodies operating within Iraq, as well as 
concealing the illicit transfer of capital and materiel banned under U.N resolution, from 
foreign powers.  Once the WMD programs were discovered, the objective shifted to 
maintaining the capability to reconstitute each program, allowing the Iraqis to safely 
dismantle existing capabilities.  Ultimately, the Iraqis hoped that an appearance of 
compliance would mean a sooner end to sanctions and inspections, giving them the 
opportunity to take on programs of WMD development.84  The focus for these efforts 
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was key leaders on the Security Council who might be amenable to hastening the end of 
sanctions and inspections.  The IAEA and UNSCOM teams were the largest target set of 
Iraqi deception, as the eyes and ears of the Security Council in Iraq. 
Saddam continued to centralize control of Iraqi programs.  In fact, once the illicit 
flow of funding started after acceptance of Oil for Food in 1996, Saddam further 
centralized industries that would aid Iraq in rebuilding its WMD programs.   This again 
ensured solid security; however, there were distinct lapses, such as the defection of 
Hussein Kamil.  Kamil served as an example to others, however, with his assassination in 
1996.  The deception campaign was truly integrated into Iraq’s overall strategy.  Feeling 
that WMDs were the key to Iraq’s global strategic importance, maintaining these 
programs (or the ability to have these programs) became one of the regime’s top 
priorities.  
Timeliness played an increasingly vital role in the deception campaign.  With the 
Security Council acceptance of “protocols” for IAEA and UNSCOM inspections, the 
Iraqis could keep inspection teams waiting outside of facilities for hours until “adequate” 
representatives could be found to meet them.85  This tactic, beginning during this period, 
would continue for the remainder of inspections, further frustrating the inspection effort. 
The Iraqi deception campaign continued to follow the Department of Defense 
framework laid out in JP 3-58.  The successes Saddam achieved in legitimate and illicit 
pursuits following the beginning of the Oil for Food campaign emboldened the dictator to 
tolerate inspections and sanctions less and less.  In fact, the world community 
(coincidentally led by the nations accused of collusion with Iraq in evading U.N. 
resolutions) seemed to lose heart at maintaining the U.N. resolutions.  As we will soon 
see, the results of this disheartening included increasing tension among the members of 
the Security Council. This division could only provide Saddam with the pretenses and 
political climate necessary to achieve his goal of ending sanctions and inspections.  The 
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D. INSPECTIONS END, BOMBS FALL:  1996-2003 
Kamil’s 1995 defection also marked a turning point in the tenor of the Iraqi 
deception.  Following his subsequent delivery of documentation of Iraq’s programs and 
capabilities, Saddam turned over the bulk of what remained.  This was a true disclosure; 
however, he remained obstinate towards allowing inspections to verify his claims.  This 
continued refusal to cooperate signaled a shift from deception to conceal capabilities to 
deception merely to cause derision among the United Nations.  Should the Security 
Council halt inspections and sanctions with clear defiance from the Iraqi dictator, 
Saddam could claim victory (much as he did in 1991), increasing his political capital at 
home and in the region, largely at the expense of the United States.   
With a “full disclosure” to the IAEA in late 1996, the Oil for Food program began 
in earnest, ostensibly allowing the Iraqi regime to earn capital from international sale of 
its oil reserves to offset the effects of the United Nations sanctions.  However, the illicit 
dealings with international political and industrial entities proved more lucrative than 
cooperation.  Duelfer reports that by 2001, Saddam was able to mitigate sanctions and 
undermine their international support.86  Earnings from the Oil for Food program more 
often fell into the coffers of the Iraqi leadership than to the besieged people of Iraq, 
keeping them in squalor and anguish, while the Baath Party leaders flourished.87  Saddam 
had the best of both worlds; while he and his closest advisors benefited financially, he 
had the ability to claim domestically that the United Nations, and more importantly, the 
United States, directly caused the suffering of the people.88
Iraqi nuclear and biological weapons programs saw very little actual gains during 
this period.  Instead, Saddam continued to bide his time until the UN sanctions were 
completely lifted.  He also had no actual plan beyond simply wanting to reconstitute his 
programs once sanctions were gone.89  Thus, he continued to maintain his intellectual 
capital by keeping a tight control over the scientists previously involved in nuclear and 
biological programs.   
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The same could not be said for Iraqi chemical weapons.  With the revenue from 
Oil for Food, Saddam immediately began to implement dual-use technologies in order to 
reconstitute a chemical weapons capability.90  This is largely due to the ease with which 
chemical weapons facilities could be concealed or disguised.  However, UNSCOM 
persevered in making several huge discoveries that called into question Iraqi intentions 
and uncovered the nature of their deception efforts.  Some of UNSCOM’s discoveries 
were not within their mandate, such as a Mukhabarat-operated terror camp,91
The first of these discoveries occurred in April of 1997 with the unexplained 
presence of trace amounts of undeclared VX gas on ballistic warheads.92  Indignant, the 
Iraqis refused to offer any explanation, choosing instead to question the validity of the 
test results, claiming that the United States lab responsible for the testing skewed the 
results to keep sanctions in place against Iraq.  UNSCOM ordered subsequent testing of 
the samples at lab in Europe.93  While this additional testing did not find conclusive 
evidence of VX, neither could the lab dispute the results of the original testing.  Iraq used 
this episode to claim irrefutable collusion between UNSCOM and the United States.  This 
claim would soon escalate even further. 
Soon after the VX incident, UNSCOM uncovered further proof of Iraqi deception 
and refusal to cooperate forthrightly with United Nations mandates.  In July 1998, 
UNSCOM inspectors discovered documentation at the Iraqi Air Force headquarters that 
detailed consumption and delivery methods of chemical weapons during the war with 
Iran.94  Fearing international reprisals at proof of Iraqi use of chemical weapons, foreign 
minister Tariq Aziz refused to comply on grounds that it would compromise Iraqi 
national security.95  Aziz then demanded that UNSCOM chairman Richard Butler make 
the final declaration of Iraqi compliance to UN mandates, allowing sanctions to be lifted.  
In the face of obfuscated inspections and unclear Iraqi intentions, Butler refused.96
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Less than one month later, Saddam Hussein ordered IAEA and UNSCOM to 
cease all activity within Iraq.  The regime apparently realized that the level of compliance 
they were offering would not serve to lift UN sanctions.  Tensions escalated as the United 
States threate97ned air strikes into Iraq to force compliance, and Saddam relented in mid-
November, allowing inspections to resume.  However, inspections in November and 
December proved fruitless, with Butler remarking that Iraqi duplicity had poisoned the 
atmosphere, making inspections impossible.98  During this period, Butler also notes that 
happenings on the international stage, notably remarks by UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan, Russian and Chinese political leaders, and wavering resolve by US President 
Clinton to enforce inspections made for Iraqi political victories.  Inspections were not 
taking place, Saddam was winning.99  The UN inspectors left Iraq on 15 December, 
1998.  The United States began a four-day bombing campaign the next day. Emboldened 
by revenue from Oil for Food and other illicit dealings, Saddam Hussein declared the end 
of Iraqi cooperation with inspections. 
UN inspections would not resume until Iraq accepted a new body mandated by 
the Security Council (UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission, or 
UNMOVIC) in 2000.  The inspectors of that body were under the direct employment of 
the UN, and not its members, as the previous organizations were.  Under the direction of 
Hans Blix, UNMOVIC inspected Iraqi sites unfettered as the crisis of late 2002 unfolded.  
Blix declared to the General Assembly in December 2002 that UNMOVIC had found no 
evidence of Iraqi weapons in over 450 inspected sites.100  This declaration, however, did 
not match intelligence received by the United States and Great Britain.  After more than a 
decade of unfulfilled obligations, parlor tricks, and games by the Iraqis, some members of 
the United Nations had obviously endured enough. 
After months of debate on the floor of the UN General Assembly, a coalition of 
nations led by the US and Great Britain toppled Saddam’s government in March 2003, 
and began the process of finding and eliminating any remnants of WMD programs.  
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However, with the conclusion of the ISG report in 2004, it became evident that while 
Saddam maintained the ability to restart nuclear, biological, and chemical programs, 
these programs were never started again in earnest after 1991, and made only scant 
progress after the declaration of 1996.101  Although the process of discovery in Iraq may 
never be complete, there is no current evidence of the existence of a WMD presence in 
from the time the inspection teams were expelled.  
Although Iraq maintained the capacity for reconstituting its weapons programs 
once the UN inspection teams were expelled, the period between 1999 and 2003 did not 
see a resurgence of Iraqi programs.  Rather, the ISG found in 2004 that Saddam had 
queried higher-ranking engineers in the programs on the viability of restarting them, but 
he never directly ordered the programs to begin.102  Thus, the maintenance of 
infrastructure, facilities, and intellectual capital evident over the previous decade of UN 
inspections was never truly exploited.  However, interviews conducted by ISG were not 
absolute.  Some of those persons interviewed claimed that secret programs could have 
continued operating, and if so, were likely operated in the headquarters of the Iraqi 
Intelligence Service.103
The objective and focus of Iraqi deception during this period was two-fold.  First 
and foremost, the Iraqi regime desperately wanted the United Nations to lift the sanctions 
imposed after the Gulf War.  They also wanted to prevent the UN member nations from 
taking decisive military action against Iraq.  In both regards, Iraqi deception efforts 
focused on the members of the UN Security Council.  However, this proved difficult, as 
the Security Council, particularly the United States, seemed vehemently opposed to 
lifting sanctions without total cooperation on the part of the Iraqis.  While this frustrated 
Iraqi intentions to lift sanctions, it served another campaign purpose. 
This tension between Iraq and members of the Security Council furthered Iraqi 
claims of impropriety within the organs of inspection, the IAEA and UNSCOM.104  In 
making and furthering these claims, the Iraqis hoped to gain favor with the other 
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members of the United Nations General Assembly, as well as with other nations in the 
region.  This tactic was more spin than deception, hoping that the perceived plight of the 
Iraqi people at the hands of malicious Western powers would carry enough weight on the 
global stage to force the lifting of sanctions.  At the very least, any degradation in the 
political hegemony of the Western powers, or forced tension between Western nations, 
would be a huge political victory for Iraq.   
Hans Blix clearly outlines the underlying argument to Iraqi intentions.  If the 
United States did not intend to support lifting sanctions until the regime had been 
removed, it did not make sense to comply with UN inspections.  More importantly, if 
Iraqi strategic aspirations hinged on achieving a WMD capability, it would not hurt to 
inspire in others the possibility that you might have them, even if you do not (the 
“’beware of dog’ sign” analogy).  To a lesser degree, Blix also attributes much of the “cat 
and mouse” game to pride.105  For a leader like Saddam, who has been described by all 
scholarly accounts as megalomaniacal106, the thought of letting pride enter into a 
hegemonic struggle for life and death is not too far-fetched.  For more recent examples of 
these tactics, one only need look as far as the deposed Iraqi leader’s trial.  Even with his 
life on the line, he continues to play similar games simply to disrupt the legal 
proceedings.107
The objective, beyond the lifting of sanctions, was for the United Nations to not 
act with decisive military force.  At times after 1996, the United Nations threatened to 
enforce mandates with military power; the United States and Great Britain, already 
enforcing “no-fly zones” in Northern and Southern Iraq, followed through on numerous 
occasions (including the previously mentioned Desert Fox campaign in 1999).  Decisive 
action on the part of the UN would certainly mean the end of the Baath regime, as it did 
in 2003.  However, Saddam continued to play games with the United Nations because he 
did not believe he would be attacked until fall 2002, when US President Bush clearly 
outlined that intention.  This tactic is very much like conducting war games along an 
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adversary’s border, edging ever closer until you elicit a response, then backing away, 
until the time when you finally cross the border to attack.  It was at this time that Saddam 
unequivocally threw his hands up in surrender to UN inspections.108  However, it is the 
same tactic he used throughout the late 1990s, during the Clinton administration, when 
faced with the threat of airstrikes, both before and after Desert Fox.109  Even in declaring 
complete submission to the UN demands, the Iraqi delegation to UNMOVIC tried to 
impart demands of its own, such as charging UNMOVIC for overtime wages incurred by 
their escorts.110
Saddam maintained centralized control of all strategic operations, including 
deception.  This continued to ensure the utmost levels of security, even though the UN 
inspection bodies were highly adept at cutting through Iraqi efforts and making findings.  
Violations of security were dealt with rather harshly.  Both the level of centralized 
control and security are demonstrated in the 1998 case of UNSCOM’s discovery of the 
“Air Force document.” Saddam directly instructed his foreign minister to forbid 
UNMOVIC to inspect the document due to “national security concerns,” and the officer 
who failed to hide the documentation of chemical weapons use during the Iran war was 
imprisoned for allowing the discovery of such critical information.111
Even though Iraq was the conquered nation, they maintained the initiative over 
the United Nations inspectors.  Multiple times, the Iraqis forced concessions on the UN 
before they would comply with inspections.  One of these concessions directly affected 
the timeliness of the deception operations.  By forcing UNSCOM and IAEA to wait for 
appropriate officials before they were allowed to conduct “surprise” inspections, the 
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E. CONCLUSIONS 
Like Germany, Iraq was able to conduct a successful deception campaign because 
numerous factors created an environment conducive to running an extensive deception 
campaign.  The Baath Party, founded on ruthless nationalism and revulsion of Western 
ideals, flourished in the tightly knit clansman atmosphere of Iraq.  With the rise of 
Saddam Hussein, this radical nationalism saw a vicious brutality and insatiable ambition 
for global political power.  For a nation only barely becoming an industrial power, the 
easiest way to achieve this desired result is through weapons of mass destruction.  Iraq 
was forced to accept the presence of foreign inspectors for its nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons programs with the defeat of the 1991 Gulf War.  This forced Iraq into 
a policy of deception; at first, to conceal the programs deemed illegal by the United 
Nations; then, to continue frustrating the UN inspectors to force an end to sanctions 
without a clear resolution, allowing Iraq to claim victory. 
Immediately following the Gulf War, the United Nations acted to initiate weapons 
inspections.  However, as clandestine rebuilding took shape, and the UN offered 
concessions such as the Oil for Food program, the Iraqis took every opportunity to 
subvert UN mandates and inspections.  Revenue from Oil for Food and other 
humanitarian concerns within Iraq only served as further spoils for the Baath regime; the 
aid never reached its intended target:  the Iraqi people.112  The regime also engaged in 
illicit deals with various nations and corporations, resulting in millions of dollars of 
illegal transactions.  Under the auspices of ending the humanitarian disaster caused by 
sanctions, Saddam Hussein’s regime fought inspections, and caused a measure of 
derision among the nations responsible for imposing those sanctions. One can only draw 
the conclusion, seeing where the illegal transactions and opposition to continued 
inspections intersect, that Iraq drew favor from nations by engaging in business deals 
banned under the UN mandates.  However, the UN resolve in continuing to press for 
inspections was undoubtedly a result of Iraq being the only nation since 1945 to use 
chemical weapons.  The sudden shift on the part of some nations to readily believe Iraq’s 
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claims of disarmament, even in the face of Iraq’s defiant lack of cooperation, only serves 
to augment the perception of impropriety in illicit dealings.   
The Iraqi deception campaign very closely following the framework for 
successful deception campaigns, meeting all requirements for successful campaigns, 
according to the framework in JP 3-58.  However, the adeptness of the UN inspectors 
defeated the deception campaign goal of masking weapons programs. This adeptness 
further exacerbated Iraqi desires to end sanctions, ultimately forcing the numerous crises 
between 1999 and 2003.   
In effect, the failure of the deception to meet one strategic goal actually allowed 
the deception to meet the second goal.  The continued defiance of UN mandate continued 
to tie up resources in the region, causing the UN to lose political capital in the region.  An 
example of this loss of regional political capital is the terror campaign currently being 
waged by Osama bin Laden against the United States.  This campaign plays on the 
ideology of pan-Arabism and Muslim fundamentalism.113  Ostensibly the United States 
and other western powers “invaded” Muslim holy lands by “occupying” Saudi Arabia 
and other Persian Gulf states after Desert Storm.114  Had the United States not been 
required to keep a steady military presence in the region following Desert Storm, the 
impetus of certain factions in the Muslim world to strike as vehemently at the United 
States may have been less. 
As the entire regime revolved around the strategic aims of a single leader, very 
little coordination was required to ensure a proper framework.  Once Iraq was offered 
concessions to ease the humanitarian concerns of its people, the regime became 
increasingly emboldened to refuse mandates by the United Nations.  However, the regime 
took care to not extend itself too quickly, as overstretching the Security Council’s 
tolerance would have warranted decisive military action.  As with most matters of state 
during his reign, Saddam Hussein and his closest advisors increasingly controlled the 
framework of the deception campaign.   
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Once the campaign sought to merely end sanctions, and degrade US political 
leverage, it saw a measure of success.  The Iraqi regime had little to lose by frustrating 
inspection efforts and forcing tension among UN members, since there was little tangible 
proof of weapons programs.  Iraq slowly curried favor with staunch US allies, such as 
Germany, France, and Russia, as well as Middle East regional powers.  This slowly 
eroded the thrall of the Security Council.  The subsequent failure of Anglo-US 
intelligence continues to weaken US political power, as is evident by the ongoing debate 
over the war in Iraq. 115
However, this latter tactic ultimately caused the failure of the strategic campaign.  
By repeatedly refusing to cooperate with UN mandates, the Iraqi regime wore out the 
patience of certain UN members, chiefly the US and Great Britain, who then sought to 
ensure compliance through regime change.  Although key pieces of pre-war intelligence 
were later proved false, the actions of Saddam Hussein in the previous decade 
undoubtedly colored the opinions of the US-led coalition.  To paraphrase Hans Blix, the 
absence of cooperation implied the presence of weapons.116
Iraq failed to adequately terminate its deception campaign.  By all rights, it had 
fully complied with the letter of UN mandates, but not the spirit.  When Hans Blix issued 
UNMOVIC’s final declaration of Iraqi disarmament in late 2002, the strategic situation 
for Iraq had deteriorated enough where Iraqi claims were not believed.  The regime had 
muddied things enough over the previous decade where the intelligence received by the 
US and Great Britain was cause enough to believe that Iraq proved an imminent threat to 
the safety of the world.  A wiser move on the part of Saddam Hussein would have been to 
comply fully with UN mandates, allow sanctions to be lifted, then rebuild Iraq’s 
capabilities once the eyes of the Security Council were elsewhere.  As the intellectual 
capital and dual-use technologies remained in Iraq even after the fall of the Baath regime, 
it is likely that the UN inspections would not have degraded them beyond repair.  As it 
was, the failure of Saddam Hussein and his advisors to convince the United Nations of 
Iraqi compliance proved to be the deciding factor in the fall of the Iraqi regime. 
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IV.  COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
We have to distrust each other.  It’s our only defense against betrayal. 
      - Tennessee Williams, Camino Real117
 
A. COMMON DECEPTION FRAMEWORK 
While both Germany and Iraq applied a framework particular to their deception 
efforts, neither country uniformly applied the common framework.  Both case studies 
properly applied the six principles of deception.  The application of those principles 
conformed to the needs of the overall strategic objectives.  Always key to the success of 
the deception efforts, the use of the six principles were at times critical to maintaining 
deception.  
1. Objective  
The campaigns in Germany and Iraq shared an overarching objective:  expelling 
inspection teams to allow unfettered rearmament and pursuit of strategic aspirations.  For 
both countries, these aspirations consisted of increasing their political power among 
regional and global nations through the use or threat of force.  Both nations steadfastly 
adhered to the former half of their objective.  Once inspections were ended in Germany, 
the Third Reich was able to realize (however temporarily) aspirations of conquest.  Iraq, 
however, was unsuccessful in reaching the end of inspections it desired, being forced to 
comply with UN directives, declaring and dismantling its weapons programs, preventing 
Iraq from attempting the latter goal. 
2. Focus 
With a clear objective, both campaigns successfully utilized the principle of focus 
to target the decision makers capable of moving in the direction required for a successful 
deception campaign.  In both campaigns, Germany and Iraq used the intelligence systems 
(in both cases, the various inspection agencies), media, and unwitting foreign agents 
(such as visiting dignitaries and celebrities) to filter misinformation to the intended 
decision makers.  This latter method had the additional intended effect of fostering a 
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measure of sympathy in foreign civilian populations, and furthering the nationalist cause 
by bolstering the influence of the German and Iraqi governments over their respective 
domestic populations.118  This focus remained clear throughout both campaigns, as 
neither government maintained any illusions that a target set other than the foreign 
decision makers would be able to end inspections in both countries and allow rearmament 
and weapons development to resume. 
3. Centralized Control 
The principle of centralized control was not as critical to the success of deception 
efforts in Germany and Iraq as having a clear focus and objective.  With the rise of 
Hitler’s Reich, the strategic planning of both nations fell to a single national leader with a 
small cadre of close advisors.  However, for much of Germany’s rearmament research 
and development, the deception efforts were controlled ad hoc by the program 
coordinators in industry and military, with little actual interaction by governmental 
entities.  After the rise of Nazi Germany, strategic planning fell on Hitler and his closest 
advisors.  Increasingly, Hitler relied on fewer advisors, ultimately taking the lion’s share 
of planning on his own shoulders.  The deception efforts by Iraq were always under the 
direction of Saddam Hussein and his advisors.   
Hundreds of other case studies have proven that deception flourishes best in 
environments where control is centralized around a highly-skilled cadre of individuals, as 
is the case with the massive efforts at disguising the Normandy invasion in 1944.119  
However, centralized control in these case studies rather served the opposite purpose.  In 
both of these cases, the heads of state personally dictated elements of the deception 
campaign.  Relying less and less on their skilled military advisors over the duration of 
their regimes, their personal decisions exposed them to failure.  It is likely in both cases 
that the inability of either Hitler or Hussein to understand the long-term effects of 
strategic thinking played a role in decidedly poor judgment.  Regardless of the poor 
outcome of centralized control in these case studies,  having such centralization remains 
critical to campaign success. 
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  While centralized control in these case studies proved problematic, the 
decentralized execution, with each individual program having a centralized control 
mechanism, functioned extremely well.  This is how Germany could successfully rearm 
throughout the 1920s while masking the programs from inspectors and intelligence 
agencies.  Iraq, on the other hand, enjoyed a rather centralized mechanism for controlling 
and masking its weapons programs.  This centralized control, though easy for 
coordination, provided UN inspectors with a single point of interest for inspections.  It 
also denied the Iraqi regime of plausible deniability enjoyed by the German government 
during its period of rearmament. 
4. Security 
Both nations proved successful in keeping their deception operations secure.  For 
the most part, knowledge of their actual operations was kept from their adversaries.  In 
Germany’s case, very little information reached the Allies about their deception 
operations.  The information that did reach sources outside of Germany fell on deaf ears.  
Internal security breaches were dealt with through harsh means; many who opposed the 
party in power (notably the various German labor and socialist parties) were found 
murdered.  While Iraq used similar means to protect operations security, the results 
proved drastically different.  Internal breaches, as in the case of Kamil’s defection, were 
dealt with in much the same manner as with Germany.  However, the security failed 
enough to let UN inspections find much information and materiel, yet not enough to 
actually confirm the dismantling of Iraqi programs after full disclosure had been made. 
5. Timeliness 
Timeliness, though important in deception campaigns, rarely played a major role 
in the German and Iraqi case studies.  In order to mask the development of weapons on 
the part of both countries, it became necessary to coordinate deception efforts to elude 
inspection teams.  Timeliness, in this instance, was critical in order to move, hide, or 
destroy evidence in advance of inspections.  Both nations were successful at this, 
although the Germans were much more subtle in their efforts, and the Iraqis were 
blatantly defiant in the face of inspections.  Timeliness, once the German strategy moved 
into a period of conquest, involved keeping their true strengths and weaknesses hidden 
from their adversaries, allowing them conquests across Europe with relative ease. 
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6. Integration 
The deception campaigns were integrated into other portions of the overall 
strategic campaign, ensuring that the deception efforts were consistent with the overall 
objectives.  The Germans successfully planned their actual and perceived military 
development and strength, keeping the Allies intimidated in the face of what proved to be 
inferior numbers.  The Iraqis centered their strategic campaign around their deception 
efforts, since the development of weapons of mass destruction was paramount to their 
foreign aspirations.  Even post-Desert Storm, the intent of Iraqi deception was to end 
sanctions as quickly as possible in order to reconstitute Iraqi weapons programs.120
The deception campaigns followed the tenets of the DoD framework.  Both 
campaigns tailored the six principles of deception around their strategic needs and 
ambitions.  The common use of the principles in these case studies lend themselves to the 
importance of having a clear objective and focus; yet the other four principles decrease in 
importance depending on the situation.  Thus, the framework seems to have a sense of 
fluidity. 
 
D. DECEPTION AND THE OVERALL NATIONAL STRATEGY 
As the principle of integration states, it is important for the deception efforts to fit 
seamlessly into the overall strategic campaign.  However, one of the tenets of deception 
planning is that the overall campaign cannot hinge on the deception aspect.  For the two 
case studies, the deception campaigns were an integral part of the overall national 
strategy, but they did not necessarily follow the latter tenet of deception. 
The strategic aims held by Germany centered on the deception campaign from the 
onset of rearmament until the Wehrmacht invaded Poland in 1939.  Deception facilitated 
the masking of weapons development, keeping Allied inspections and intelligence from 
discovering their programs.  Once overt rearmament began in earnest, culminating in the 
invasion of Poland, the success of the deception campaign gradually caused the downfall 
of the strategic campaign.121  As control further centralized under Hitler, and resources 
prevented actual military build-up from reaching the deceptive military strength, the 
 
120 Duelfer, Vol I, 30. 
121 Whaley, 97-100. 
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overwhelming production and resource capacity of the Allies quickly overtook what 
Germany could produce.122  The only problem is that the one person who controlled 
strategy is the only person who didn’t realize Germany’s predicament.  Thus the 
relationship between the deception and overall campaigns diverges from the tenet-based 
relationship in that successful deception largely contributed to the failure of the strategic 
campaign.   While the German ambitions for expansion and conquest were realized for a 
short time, these ambitions led to Germany’s ultimate defeat in 1945.  Had the German 
leadership not been convinced of an exaggerated military strength, it is likely that these 
ambitions would have resulted in much more cautious campaign execution with the fall 
of Western Europe in 1940. 
Iraq, like Germany, centered its strategic campaign on its deception efforts.  Only 
through deception could Iraq hope to simultaneously maintain a capability for weapons 
programs after defeat in 1991 while persuading the United Nations that such programs 
did not exist.  While the deception itself was only ever mildly successful, as the United 
Nations proved resilient and successful in rooting out evidence of Iraq’s programs, it 
served to steel the resolve of the UN to maintain inspections, and also the resolve of the 
Iraqis to fight them.  As the defection of a key Iraqi leader in 1996 forced a strategic shift 
to full disclosure, the Iraqis remained petulant and argumentative towards inspections.  
They presumably wished to maintain a defiant credibility in the face of the international 
community, yet it maintained the appearance that they still hid weapons programs.  This 
shift in deception proved to ultimately defeat the strategic aims of Iraq; chiefly to end 
sanctions, remove inspectors, and reconstitute weapons programs.  The success of the 
deception campaign, followed by the failure of the Iraqis to convince the UN that its 
deception campaign had ended, is directly responsible for the failure of the overall 
national strategy, invasion, and defeat in 2003. 
 
 
E. CAMPAIGN TERMINATION 
It has already been stated that every military plan should take into account the 
amount of time that a campaign is viable.  Germany and Iraq were unable to successfully 
 
122 Murray, Strategy for Defeat, 6-7. 
60 
terminate their deception campaigns.  This failure in termination contributed to the failure 
of the overall campaign. 
 Germany successfully conducted a deception campaign.  However, when the 
hostilities that opened the Second World War began, Germany did not terminate its 
deception campaign, choosing rather to let it propagate, as it yielded tremendous 
successes against the Allies and boosted morale domestically.  While the Allied forces 
enjoyed numerical superiority, the early edge gained by the Germans allowed the 
Wehrmacht the opportunity to fortify Europe, making the 1944 Allied invasion all the 
more difficult.  However, failure to terminate the deception of a German juggernaut 
undoubtedly strengthened the Allied resolve to out produce the Third Reich in men and 
materiel.  This resource advantage gave the Allies ultimate victory.  Had the Germans 
pulled the reins on deception after the substantial gains at the Munich conference and 
allowed its own military-industrial complex to catch up with its perceived strength, 
Germany would undoubtedly have become much stronger, and possibly wielded more 
power against its adversaries. 
 Iraq, again like Germany, also failed to successfully terminate its deception 
campaign.  Once they made a full declaration of weapons programs in 1996, they 
continued to act defiantly towards inspections, giving the impression that they continued 
to hide programs from UNSCOM and IAEA.  This defiance yielded gains for Iraq among 
its regional neighbors, sympathetic “non-state” actors (such as Al Qaeda and other terror 
groups), and bolstered domestics popularity among members of the population who were 
not already disillusioned by the brutal Baath regime.  The refusal of the UN to press 
immediately for ultimate, final verification propagated the perception that Iraq continued 
to hide weapons programs.  Instead of galvanizing UN resolve, the continued dilemma of 
Iraq, compounded by the corrupt yield of illicit financial deals between Saddam 
Hussein’s regime, corporations, and governments abroad, instead fractured the Security 
Council, resulting in the 2003 invasion.  Had Saddam yielded fully in 1996, submitting to 
the will of the Security Council, full and complete verification of his weapons programs 
may have been quick in coming.  This would have been a strategic victory, as the 
intellectual capital needed for weapons programs would remain intact; yet Saddam would 
have ended inspections and sanctions.  From another perspective, by allowing a US-led 
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coalition to invade and topple the Iraqi regime, Saddam achieved his strategic aim to 
subvert US credibility, though it cost him dearly. 
 
F. LESSONS FOR CAMPAIGN PLANNERS 
The deception campaigns conducted by Germany and Iraq offer valuable insight 
into operating a successful deception effort, and also how successful deception can prove 
dangerous to strategic objectives.   
The most important lesson in campaign planning from these case studies is that a 
successful deception campaign requires the tailored use of all six principles of deception.  
Above all, with emphasis on a clear objective and focus and a viable plan for operations 
security, it is possible to conduct a campaign with the other principles tailored to meet the 
needs of the strategic campaign.  While there is an element of discipline required to run a 
successful deception, attempting to fit a deception campaign into a cookie cutter mold 
will only spell disaster for the overall objective. 
Additionally, these case studies show that deception is only possible when there is 
clear policy guidance available to govern the campaign.  In both Germany and Iraq, the 
deception plans were tightly linked to national strategy.  Without this clear guidance, 
planning might conflict with national objectives, and the actions of other arms of the 
government, such as negotiation efforts with a nation over their weapons proliferation 
while running a bombing campaign over that nation’s territory.  While this example does 
not demonstrate deception, it might appear to the other nation or the global community 
that the United States is trying to deceive. 
While these case studies do not support the idea of centralizing control, ensuring 
that control is centralized to a small group of skilled individuals is essential.  While it is 
important to keep the number of controlling participants to the lowest number possible, a 
good OPSEC plan allows for decentralized execution, delegating deception to a tactical 
or operational level.  There is a definite point, as both case studies demonstrate, where 
having only a select few individuals involved in maintaining a deception campaign 
actually contributes to strategic failure. 
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The most important factor to consider outside of the principles of deception is 
campaign termination.  It is imperative that deception campaigns be terminated properly, 
and in a timely manner.  Largely this termination affects the centralized control aspect of 
the deception.  If the control is not centralized, it would be much more difficult to 
terminate the campaign.  Both case studies also demonstrate that deception campaigns, 
left unchecked, can carry a life of their own, resulting in disaster.  Even a successful 
deception campaign, if not maintained, then terminated at the end of its usefulness, can 
leave a national strategy, if not the regime that developed it, in ruins. 
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V. FINAL OBSERVATIONS 
Wisdom will save you from the ways of wicked men, from men whose 
words are perverse,  
Who leave the straight paths to walk in dark ways,  
Who delight in doing wrong and rejoice in the perverseness of evil, 
Whose paths are crooked and who are devious in their ways. 
- Proverbs 2:12-15 
 
A. HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH REVISITED 
This thesis examined two examples of strategic deception campaigns to determine 
the necessity for a clear framework, to decide how deception campaigns could 
successfully meet the overall national strategic goals of each nation.  With the mindset of 
a pending overhaul in the way that the Department of Defense conducts business, 
understanding the importance of deception will become increasingly vital as the military 
becomes lighter and leaner.  With such a change in the makeup of the force, old 
conventions of warfare, requiring a numerical advantage, may have to be forsaken in 
favor of techniques traditionally considered non-traditional.  By developing such a 
doctrine now, the challenge will be met before it actually arises.  The key to doing so is 
examining past successes and failures, learning from history’s mistakes.  Using the DoD 
framework as a basis, it is possible to use the analysis of these case studies to develop a 
planning method to mitigate many of the hurdles experienced in these campaigns, from 
campaign execution to termination.   
One hypothesis of this paper is proven correct.  A deception campaign must 
follow a viable framework.  However, this framework does not have to follow a set 
pattern.  Rather, following a preconceived pattern can prove more hazardous to a national 
strategy, as it does not build in the flexibility necessary to maintain the deception over a 
long period of time.  True as well is the postulation that a campaign requires a clear 
termination point.  As the case studies prove, failure to adequately and completely end 
deception can have disastrous consequences, especially if adversaries decide to call your 
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bluff.  In a world where absolutes can harm your efforts, terminating the campaign is a 
singularly distinctive exception.  If we look again at the traditional equation of military 
victory: 
Winning = Campaign Over 
This formula indeed does not apply for deception efforts.  The challenge in ending a 
deception campaign is doing so in such a manner that it does not compromise your 
overall strategic objectives or the viability of your regime.   
 Even if there is a framework developed for a deception campaign, there are other 
factors for planners to consider.  As the case studies show, environment contributes to the 
ability of a nation to run a strategic deception campaign.  While the nations examined 
were in circumstances that fostered a ripe environment for deception, the United States 
does not have such a background, nor is it foreseeable that the US will develop 
circumstances similar enough to develop the environment enjoyed by Germany and Iraq.   
 Those background factors, however, did contribute to the perceptual biases by the 
adversaries of those nations.  In the case of Germany, these perceptions aided the success 
of the deception campaign by lulling the Allies into a sense of complacency about 
Germany’s condition.  This allowed them to persuade the Allies into ending inspections, 
and later to cede an increasing amount of territory.  For Iraq, similar perceptions had the 
opposite effect of persuading the UN that Iraq continued to be less than forthright, even 
after a full disclosure had been made. 
 The hypothesis and research for these case studies are sound, and provide a solid 
basis for deception planners to use in developing a tailor-made framework depending on 
the individual situations.  By building this flexibility into a campaign, the chances for 
success are greatly increased. 
 With deception comes a set of inherent dangers.  These dangers include causing 
the enemy to increase their own efforts, deceiving yourself, and having your adversary 
call your bluff.  Both of the case studies examined in this paper demonstrated the 
detrimental effects of these dangers.  The case studies also prove that even successful 
deception campaigns can have negative effects on the national strategy.  Both Germany 
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and Iraq deception efforts met the goals of the deception.  However, ultimately the 
deception efforts caused disaster for both countries.  In the case of Germany, producing a 
convincing deception of an exaggerated Wehrmacht strength caused the Allies to ramp up 
production of their own military forces, allowing them to easily outstrip German 
production.  For Iraq, years of trying to conceal WMD programs from the UN meant that 
even when finally compliant, many member nations would not believe statements of 
compliance.  This is largely due to the continued Iraqi refusal to allow full and total 
access to inspectors.  Both deception campaigns ultimately caused utter strategic failure. 
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
While this thesis is directed towards developing a basic understanding of military 
operations, it is possible to delve deeper into understanding the practices and theory of 
deception campaigns.  There are many other examples of deception campaigns, from the 
attack of Troy to the myriad of deception during the Cold War, that offer valuable lessons 
for campaign planners.  Drilling down from the strategic level, the examples increase 
dramatically, giving students the opportunity to examine tactical applications of 
deception.  The relationships between the principles and practices can help to further 
develop deception principles, and provide the basis for integrating those practices into 
doctrine, enhancing the capability of the US military.  The sources used for this paper are 
by no means comprehensive, and included a wide range of primary and secondary 
sources on both case studies.  As most writings on deception since the end of the Cold 
War tend to be reflective, the potential exists for further research and development into 
deception doctrine.  Only by developing this “lost art” can we ensure that the US military 
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